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TASING THE CONSTITUTION: CONDUCTED
ELECTRICAL WEAPONS, OTHER FORCEFUL ARREST




Conducted electrical weapons (CEWs)—the most famous and widely used of
which are offered under the TASER brand—are ubiquitous tools of law enforce-
ment, carried by the vast majority of law enforcement officers and routinely de-
ployed. These devices subdue targets by coursing electric current through their
bodies, thereby causing individuals to collapse as their muscles involuntarily con-
tract. Yet this method of operation has raised concerns—voiced by researchers,
advocates, and criminal defendants alike—that CEWs influence cognitive capacity
in addition to muscle function as electric current potentially transits through the
brain via the central nervous system. In the context of an arrest, this implicates
criminal suspects’ ability to understand Miranda warnings given by officers and to
competently waive their constitutional rights against self-incrimination and to
counsel. Some have gone so far as to recommend a mandated delay between when
suspects are tased and when officers may administer Miranda warnings in order to
protect individuals’ rights. Intimate understandings of the law of Miranda v. Arizona
and the true effects of CEWs on cognitive capacity are critical for determining the
prudence of this recommendation, and have broader implications for the criminal
justice system.
This Article is the first to conduct a thorough survey and analysis of the law of
Miranda with regard to how courts determine whether individuals’ waivers of their
constitutional rights following Miranda warnings are knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary. Ultimately, cognitive capacity is an important factor, but, in examining this
faculty, courts generally rely most heavily on subjective indicia of mental acuity
* Visiting Researcher, Georgetown University, Center for Clinical Bioethics, Neuroethics
Studies Program. This Article benefited greatly from presentation at the 2017 Annual Meeting
of the International Neuroethics Society. Thank you to the organizers and participants of that
conference. Many thanks also to the Honorable Scott W. Stucky, Stephen J. Morse, David
Rudovsky, Martha J. Farah, James A. Young, and Geoffrey E. Curfman for helpful discussions
and comments on earlier drafts of this piece. Finally, the author owes a great debt to Catherine
Kuersten for her dedicated editing and critiquing. Without her, the piece would certainly be
worse off. Any mistakes or omissions are solely those of the author.
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manifested at the time Miranda warnings were administered—e.g., reasoning
ability, tone, bodily movements, and temperament. Objective indicia of mental
acuity—i.e., those shown through empirical research to signal cognitive ability, such
as age, education, intelligence, and blood alcohol content—are routinely treated as
less valuable than subjective indicia, particularly when the two are in opposition.
This presents a high bar for empirical research on the cognitive effects of CEWs to
scale in order to meaningfully influence court determinations of the legitimacy of
rights waivers.
This Article is also the first to conduct a comprehensive survey and examination
of the literature addressing the cognitive effects of CEWs and compare these effects
to those of other forceful arrest methods. Studies reveal that, rather than having a
unique effect on cognition through some interaction between electric current and the
brain, CEWs actually appear to impact mental faculties through a general stress effect,
which other forceful methods of arrest have as well—e.g., physical altercation, police
dog attack, and pepper spray. Therefore, an exceptional rule requiring a delay in ad-
ministering Miranda warnings to suspects subject to CEWs does not seem appropriate.
Nevertheless, the literature does show forceful arrest methods meaningfully affect-
ing individual mental acuity. While more research is necessary to more finely deduce
the extent of these impacts, they appear to be such that courts should consider a
forceful arrest close enough in time to the administration of a Miranda warning to
be a negative factor in assessing defendants’ competence to waive their rights,
similar to evidence indicating low intelligence or intoxication at the time of waiver.
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INTRODUCTION
In ancient mythology, Zeus, the Greek king of the gods, employed electricity to
devastating effect, hurling lightning bolts to vanquish his enemies and punish those
who transgressed against him.1 His manipulation of this powerful natural force is,
of course, fantastical, but in the late 1700s, the Zeus of the animal kingdom was dis-
covered in the form of a fish—more specifically, an eel.2 While humans have been
aware for thousands of years that certain fish deliver painful shocks, the mechanism
by which they do so was not accurately contemplated until naturalists connected this
action with nascent electricity research.3 Eels use electrical current in a highly con-
trolled fashion: they emit short bursts to locate prey by inducing muscle twitches
and movement in nearby organisms, then discharge a longer and more intense burst
to immobilize targets for consumption.4 They also engage their electrical faculties
for defense against intruding animals and objects.5
It took a few centuries after the aforementioned discovery, but humans finally
also developed the capability to deploy electrical current in a controlled manner to
incapacitate others.6 In 1969, John Cover conceived the first conducted electrical
weapon (CEW), which he called a “TASER” (a near-accurate acronym for the early
twentieth century novel Thomas Swift and His Electric Rifle).7 In essence, the
TASER operates by firing two darts into an individual, each tethered to the device’s
main handheld body by a wire, and emitting an electrical current that flows through
the target and causes his muscles to contract involuntarily.8 Over the ensuing
decades, these weapons worked their way into the armories of the vast majority of
law enforcement agencies and onto the duty belts of officers as a non-lethal, ranged
means of subduing individuals.9 Like the mighty Zeus and slightly less mighty eel,
1 JOHN S. FRIEDMAN, OUT OF THE BLUE: A HISTORY OF LIGHTNING: SCIENCE, SUPERSTI-
TION, AND AMAZING STORIES OF SURVIVAL 27–28 (2008).
2 Carl Zimmer, The Surprising Power of an Electric Eel’s Shock, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/science/the-surprising-power-of-an-electric-eels
-shock.html?_r=0 [https://nyti.ms/1yWwGMH].
3 Id.; see Peter Kellaway, The Part Played by Electric Fish in the Early History of Bio-
electricity and Electrotherapy, 20 BULL. HIST. MED. 112, 117–24 (1946) (describing ancient
attempts to understand the mechanism behind the shocks of electric fish).
4 Kenneth Catania, The Shocking Predatory Strike of the Electric Eel, 346 SCI. 1231,
1231–34 (2014).
5 James Gorman, Like a Slimy Taser, Electric Eels Can Leap Out and Zap Their Prey,
N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/science/like-a-slimy-taser
-electric-eels-can-leap-out-and-zap-their-prey.html [https://nyti.ms/1TS7UF6].
6 See infra notes 190–91 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 190–93 and accompanying text. See generally VICTOR APPLETON, TOM
SWIFT AND HIS ELECTRIC RIFLE (1911).
8 See infra Section II.B.2.
9 See infra notes 194–255 and accompanying text; see also Natalie Todak et al., Overcoming
the Challenges of Experimental Research: Lessons from a Criminal Justice Case Study Involving
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authorities now deploy electrical current hundreds of thousands of times annually
against suspected criminals.10
But along with the physically damaging and incapacitating effects of electrical
current, humans have also been aware of this force’s effects on cognition for some
time.11 Beginning in the eighteenth century, researchers made concerted efforts to
explore the potential positive and negative psychological effects of administering
electrical current to the human body.12 “The power of electric shocks to the head was
demonstrated by accounts of memory loss and sometimes of mental stimulation or
improvement,” and scientists and medical practitioners experimented extensively
with different methods and intensities of electrical stimulation.13 Over the decades,
electrotherapy for psychological and neurological purposes steadily proliferated in
research and medical practice.14 Today, procedures such as the relatively mild and
targeted transcranial direct-current stimulation and the relatively intense electro-
convulsive therapy are widely employed, and, understood to meaningfully impact
cognitive capacity, both positively and negatively, as primary and secondary effects.15
In addition, an extensive body of literature exists documenting cognitive declines
in individuals who suffer electrical injuries from contact with domestic and commer-
cial power sources.16
Given that CEWs course electrical current through the human body, it is a small
wonder that their potential diminishing of mental acuity emerged as both a scientific
and legal issue. Criminal defendants appear to be the first actors to meaningfully fo-
cus on this matter beginning in the mid-2000s.17 They argued that, as a result of being
subdued and arrested through the use of CEWs, they did not adequately comprehend
subsequent Miranda warnings administered to them and did not knowingly, intelli-
gently, or voluntarily waive their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to silence and
TASER Exposure, 42 EVALUATION REV. 358, 363 (2018) (“[CEWs] such as the TASER have
become a fundamental part of the police arsenal.”).
10 See infra notes 265–68 and accompanying text.
11 Paul Elliott, Electricity and the Brain: An Historical Evaluation, in THE STIMULATED
BRAIN: COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT USING NON-INVASIVE BRAIN STIMULATION 3–6 (Roi
Cohen Kadosh ed., 2014).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 8–9.
14 Id. at 7–28.
15 See, e.g., Ingrid Moreno-Duarte et al., Transcranial Electrical Stimulation: Trans-
cranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS), Transcranial Alternating Current Stimulation
(tACS), Transcranial Pulsed Current Stimulation (tPCS), and Transcranial Random Noise
Stimulation (tRNS), in THE STIMULATED BRAIN: COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT USING NON-
INVASIVE BRAIN STIMULATION, supra note 11, at 37–47; Kate E. Hoy & Paul B. Fitzgerald,
Brain Stimulation in Psychiatry and Its Effects on Cognition, 6 NATURE REVS. NEUROLOGY 267,
267–68 (2010); Harold A. Sackeim et al., The Cognitive Effects of Electroconvulsive Therapy
in Community Settings, 32 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 244, 244–45, 252–53 (2007).
16 See infra Section II.C.1.
17 See infra Section I.E.
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counsel, respectively.18 Accordingly, any statements made to police following their
allegedly invalid waivers were argued to require suppression.19
Aside from one doctoral dissertation,20 researchers did not turn their attention
to the potential cognitive effects of CEW strikes until defendants shined a spotlight
on it. Since then, however, a number of studies have been published examining the
issue.21 Most notably, the authors of one such work put forth that CEWs do in fact
meaningfully compromise individual mental ability, and do so to the point that
special legal safeguards should be put in place to protect the constitutional rights of
suspects subjected to these devices.22 Specifically, they contend that a sixty-minute
waiting period should be required before officers can administer Miranda warnings to
suspects exposed to CEWs and they can be deemed competent to waive their rights.23
Media outlets reported heavily on these findings and recommendations,24 publishing
pieces with such provocative titles as, “Tasers [sic] Are Bad For Your Brain,”25 and,
“Tasing Temporarily Affects Brain Function, Comparable to Dementia.”26 But while
one study has dominated public discourse on the issue, its findings do not represent
a consensus among researchers. Rather, there exists a stark divide between those
who interpret relevant study results to reveal a significant CEW effect on cognition27
18 See infra Section I.E.
19 See infra Section I.E.
20 Amy Bagley, The Neuropsychological Effects Associated with Taser Administrations
(May 15, 2008) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine and
Science) (on file with ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global).
21 See infra Section II.C.2.
22 Robert J. Kane & Michael D. White, TASER Exposure and Cognitive Impairment:
Implications for Valid Miranda Waivers and the Timing of Police Custodial Interrogations,
15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 79, 101 (2015).
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Nathan Collins, Don’t Tase My Brain, Bro, PAC. STANDARD (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://psmag.com/news/dont-tase-my-brain-bro [https://perma.cc/9EGH-U9RE]; Brooks Hays,
Taser’s Effect on Cognition May Undermine Police Questioning, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Feb. 4,
2016), https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2016/02/04/Tasers-effect-on-cognition-may-under
mine-police-questioning/1751454607351/ [https://perma.cc/HDB4-88C6]; David Kravets,
Study: Suspects Shocked by Taser “More Likely” to Waive Miranda Rights, ARS TECHNICA
(Feb. 5, 2016, 1:45 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02/study-suspects-shocked
-by-taser-more-likely-to-waive-miranda-rights/ [https://perma.cc/NLW5-ZCUT]; Tim Stelloh,
What Does 50,000 Volts from a Taser Do to Your Brain?, NBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:06
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/what-does-50-000-volts-taser-do-your-brain
-n514191 [https://perma.cc/MA44-76TD].
25 Anthony L. Fisher, Tasers Are Bad for Your Brain, Especially when Being Interro-
gated by Police, REASON (Feb. 10, 2016), http://reason.com/blog/2016/02/10/tasers-are-bad
-for-your-brain-miranda [https://perma.cc/KZW6-JSVN].
26 Elisa Lala, Study: Tasing Temporarily Affects Brain Function, Comparable to Dementia,
PHILLYVOICE (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.phillyvoice.com/study-tasing-temporarily-affects
-brain-function-comparable-dementia/ [https://perma.cc/M22M-P687].
27 See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella, Neuroscience and the Potential Need for a New Bright-Line
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and those who interpret such results to reveal only a modest effect unworthy of
distinctive legal treatment.28
So do CEWs actually meaningfully impact cognition? And if so, is it to a degree
that the weapons compromise individuals’ capacities to exercise their constitutional
rights unless exceptional safeguards are put in place? Given the nearly complete
permeation of CEWs through law enforcement entities and their frequent use to
subdue and arrest criminal suspects, answering these questions is material to ensur-
ing individuals are not denied their constitutional rights and the criminal legal system
functions in a just fashion.
This Article engages the implications of the potential cognitive effects of CEWs
and the validity of subsequent in-custody waivers of Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights in three parts. Part I analyzes the legal standard for a valid waiver of one’s
rights first established in Miranda v. Arizona in 1966,29 and since extensively de-
veloped by both federal and state courts.30 Critical to whether the law should uniquely
account for CEW strikes is how this standard incorporates defendant mental ability at
the time of waiver and how courts determine this characteristic. This section offers a
novel analysis of Miranda and its progeny in this regard. It is shown that cognitive
capacity is a critical factor in all three prongs of the requirement that waivers be know-
ing, intelligent, and voluntary.31 However, courts show a marked preference for
relying on subjective assessments of defendant behavior at the time of waiver over
more objective and detached indicators of mental competence like age, education, and
intelligence (as measured by intelligence quotient (IQ) tests and scores).32 Seeing as
how any findings of cognitive deficits precipitated by CEWs fall under the latter
category, this means that substantial impairment must be shown for this evidence
to have meaningful singular influence on court waiver determinations, particularly
to the point that specific, per se CEW legal safeguards should be instituted. A case
survey is then conducted of published court orders and opinions addressing CEWs
and waivers of constitutional rights.33
Part II is the most substantial portion of the Article, delving into the history,
functioning, and cognitive effects of CEWs. Significant attention is paid to the
Rule Concerning Miranda Waivers After CED Exposure, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 117,
126 (2015); Kane & White, supra note 22.
28 See, e.g., Donald M. Dawes et al., The Neurocognitive Effects of a Conducted Electrical
Weapon Compared to High Intensity Interval Training and Alcohol Intoxication: Implications
for Miranda and Consent, 53 J. FORENSIC & LEGAL MED. 51, 55 (2018) [hereinafter Dawes
et al., Conducted Electrical Weapon]; Donald M. Dawes et al., The Neurocognitive Effects
of Simulated Use-of-Force Scenarios, 10 FORENSIC SCI., MED. & PATHOLOGY 9, 16 (2014)
[hereinafter Dawes et al., Use-of-Force Scenarios].
29 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
30 See infra Sections I.A–D.
31 See infra Sections I.B–C.
32 See infra Section I.D.
33 See infra Section I.E.
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science of CEWs so as to provide the most beneficial resource for scholars and
practitioners who must confront the legal implications of these devices, and to most
effectively influence the positive advancement of law. The section begins by pro-
viding a detailed background of the invention of CEWs and how they came to be
near ubiquitous in law enforcement.34 This presentation underscores the importance
of engaging the issue of whether the devices impact cognition and defendants’ com-
petence to waive their constitutional rights. The section then examines the science
behind CEWs, beginning with the basic importance of electrical current to bodily
function and how the devices exploit this fact to incapacitate targets.35 The lack of
understanding of the exact mechanism by which the weapons influence areas of the
body remote from where they impact is noted, as is the dominant theory that electri-
cal current is conducted through the spinal cord to these regions and how such
current might thereby reach the brain and affect mental faculties.36 Next, the litera-
ture revealing cognitive deficits resulting from electrical injuries is reviewed, these
works having helped inspire studies of CEWs and cognition.37 A comprehensive and
in-depth analysis is then conducted of all studies examining the potential causal link
between CEW administration and mental impairment.38 The parameters, substantial
findings, and limitations of these works are presented. Given that an academic
review in this area does not exist, this Article provides such a review. It therefore
gives legal scholars and practitioners a detailed overview of available expert mate-
rial on the potential link between CEWs and cognitive deficits, and reveals to
researchers the most fruitful methods and avenues for further investigation. This
review concludes that CEWs appear to affect cognition, but to a non-specific degree
in line with other forceful arrest methods (e.g., direct physical subjugation, canine
attack, and pepper spray administration). Accordingly, given current research, CEW
use during arrest should be lumped in with other forceful arrest methods as a
negative influence on a defendant’s comprehension of his constitutional rights at the
time of waiver, depending on the waiver’s temporal proximity to the arrest.
Finally, Part III explores a void in court opinions and research addressing the
factors that influence a defendant’s ability to knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily waive his constitutional rights. As noted above, courts tend to rely on subjective
assessments of defendant behavior at the time of waiver, giving less regard to ob-
jective indicia of mental incompetence.39 In terms of the influence of forceful arrest
circumstances on this characteristic, courts rely entirely on witness descriptions of
defendant conduct following these confrontations and their own interpretations of
whether the circumstances had any cognitive effects.40 The fact that the scientific
34 See infra Section II.A.
35 See infra Section II.B.
36 See infra Section II.B.2.
37 See infra Section II.C.1.
38 See infra Section II.C.2.
39 See infra Section I.D and Part III.
40 See infra Part III.
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literature reveals such arrest situations to negatively impact individual psychological
faculties is never mentioned. Rather, and unfortunately, these occurrences are viewed
as having no effect or detrimental effect depending solely on visceral assessments.
But it is not just courts that ignore the science behind forceful arrest methods and
cognitive ability.41 Judicial treatments reflect an anemic literature on the subject.
Research on the factors that influence one’s ability to comprehend his constitutional
rights and competently waive them overwhelmingly focuses on more static individ-
ual characteristics such as age, education, mental health, and intelligence (as mea-
sured by IQ tests).42 Aside from the CEW research examined in Part II, no studies
have investigated the potential influence of forceful arrest conditions on rights warn-
ing comprehension. This Article expressly links research on the cognitive effects of
these circumstances with Miranda warning and rights comprehension research,
arguing that a forceful arrest recent in time prior to a rights waiver should be an ob-
jectively negative factor in court determinations of whether a defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights.
I. KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY
Whether and to what degree CEWs affect cognition are only constitutionally
relevant to the validity of a suspect’s in-custody waiver of his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights if the applicable legal standard allows them to be. This section
therefore dissects that standard’s allowance for the influence of an individual’s
mental faculties on determinations of his waiver’s legal legitimacy. It then examines
the implications for CEWs and how courts have thus far treated these devices when
invoked to challenge waiver validity.
A. Forming the Standard
In 1966, the Supreme Court held in the seminal Miranda v. Arizona that, prior
to in-custody interrogation, a suspect must be advised of his Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights, “that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.”43 These rights may, however, be waived,
“provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intelligently.”44
On its face, the terminology of the waiver standard implicates suspects’ cogni-
tive abilities. But these abilities are not expressly offered as relevant in Miranda,
which is almost entirely concerned with law enforcement. A substantial portion of
41 See infra Part III.
42 See infra Part III.
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Court does, however, allow for “other
fully effective means” to apprise a suspect of his rights and the consequences of waiving
them. Id.
44 Id.
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the opinion’s length is devoted to describing the coercive nature of in-custody in-
terrogation and how it compels suspects to incriminate themselves.45 While instances
of “physical brutality” and threats of such conduct are provided as overt examples
of officers’ potent tactics, the Court notes that, as a result of its precedent condemn-
ing these practices, they “are undoubtedly the exception now.”46 Rather, “the modern
practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically ori-
ented,”47 and it had already been legally recognized for some time that unlawful
“coercion can be mental as well as physical.”48 But the Court goes farther than simply
reiterating that psychological interrogation techniques can abridge constitutional
rights, finding that they are so consistently employed and effective that “the very
fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on
the weakness of individuals.”49 Accordingly, regardless of suspects’ individual mental
capacity, such methods always abridge constitutional rights unless effective proce-
dural safeguards are mandated and deployed.50
The Court then proceeds to outline the safeguard to be utilized: the advisement
of one’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and the consequences of waiving them
noted above that must precede in-custody interrogation, now called a “Miranda
warning.”51 And “[a]fter such warnings have been given, and such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer questions or make a statement.”52 Such a waiver must be explicit,
and “will not be presumed simply from . . . silence” or the fact that a suspect
converses to some extent prior to invoking his rights.53 A waiver can, however, still
be deemed invalid as involuntary should it be found to have been elicited by unlaw-
ful compulsion.54
45 See id. at 456 (“In the cases before us today, . . . we concern ourselves primarily with
th[e] interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring.”).
46 Id. at 446–47. For an illustration of Supreme Court precedent rebuking physical in-
terrogation methods, see, for example, Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 406 (1945); White
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 532 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936). For a
sampling of the “exceptions” that the Court notes, see, for example, Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d
59, 59 (7th Cir. 1958); Kier v. State, 132 A.2d 494, 497–99 (Md. 1957); People v. Portelli,
205 N.E.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. 1965).
47 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
48 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940)).
49 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
50 Id. at 457–58.
51 See, e.g., Bryan Taylor, You Have the Right to Be Confused! Understanding Miranda
After 50 Years, 36 PACE L. REV. 160, 171 (2015) (stating that, in Miranda, “the [Supreme]
Court set forth what would come to be known as Miranda warnings”).
52 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
53 Id. at 475.
54 Id. at 476.
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The only points at which the Court brings up suspect cognitive capacity are
where it expressly disavows the relevance of such factors in determining whether
Miranda warnings are required.55 They must always be administered because “[i]t
is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant” who are vulnerable to law enforce-
ment interrogation stratagems.56 Moreover, “[a]ssessments of the knowledge the
defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or
prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a
clearcut fact.”57
Overall, a waiver is presented as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary if it (1) fol-
lows a proper rights advisement and (2) is not the product of coercion. Both of these
factors are dependent on the conduct of authorities. With regard to knowledge and
intelligence, a suspect’s actual knowledge and intelligence in relation to his rights
are not clearly implicated. The advisement of rights and consequences is put forth as
a singular proxy for the presence of these requirements. However, Miranda exten-
sively cites precedent outlining the condition that waivers of the right to counsel
must be “intelligent and competent” to be valid, and that this “depend[s], in each
case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”58
In terms of the voluntariness of a waiver, the Court does not mention a suspect’s
susceptibility to law enforcement coercion.59 But a more expansive reading of this
prong is warranted for a similar reason as that for the first two: the opinion’s consis-
tent invocation of precedent pertaining to the voluntariness of confessions indicating
that suspects’ individual vulnerability can be a factor. In these cases, “a totality of
the circumstances” is considered60 as to whether official conduct unlawfully “engen-
der[s] either hope or fear” in a suspect that induces a confession,61 including “the
confessor’s strength or weakness, whether he was educated or illiterate, intelligent
or moronic, well or ill.”62
55 Id. at 457, 468–69.
56 Id. at 468.
57 Id. at 468–69 (internal citation omitted).
58 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 164
(1957) (considering the defendant’s age, education, intelligence, and mental health in asses-
sing the intelligence of his waiver of his right to counsel); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 724 (1948) (“To be valid[,] [a] waiver [of the right to counsel] must be made with an ap-
prehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range
of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in
mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.
A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly
and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circum-
stances under which such a plea is tendered.”).
59 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45.
60 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
61 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 557–58 (1897).
62 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 162 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see Spano
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Thus, as originally expressed, the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard
for a valid in-custody waiver of one’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights leaves no
apparent role for suspect cognitive capacity at the time of waiver. But a more in-
depth reading of Miranda illuminates the Court’s unenunciated incorporation of this
factor—the importance of which has been substantially expounded upon as courts
continue to interpret and apply this law.
B. Knowing and Intelligent
The first two prongs of the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard pro-
nounced in Miranda are rarely addressed separately.63 It therefore makes sense to
analyze them together.
As it stands, a waiver is “knowing” if the defendant was aware of the nature of
the rights being waived at the time of waiver.64 And it is “intelligent” if he was aware
of the consequences of waiving his rights at that moment.65 However, an understand-
ing of “every possible consequence of a waiver” is not necessary.66 The Supreme Court
of Illinois, in People v. Bernasco, provides a helpful summary of these requirements:
If intelligent knowledge in the Miranda context means anything,
it means the ability to understand the very words used in the warn-
ings. It need not mean the ability to understand far-reaching legal
and strategic effects of waiving one’s rights, or to appreciate how
widely or deeply an interrogation may probe, or to withstand the
influence of stress or fancy; but to waive rights intelligently and
knowingly, one must at least understand basically what those
rights encompass and minimally what their waiver will entail.67
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321–22, 322 n.3 (1959) (considering the defendant’s education,
mental health, and intelligence in assessing the voluntariness of his confession); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1940) (considering the defendants’ “ignoran[ce]” in asses-
sing the voluntariness of their confessions).
63 See, e.g., Woodley v. Bradshaw, 451 F. App’x 529, 540 (6th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 142–43 (4th Cir. 2002); People v. Knedler, 329 P.3d 242, 245–47
(Colo. 2014); People v. Daoud, 614 N.W.2d 152, 159–63 (Mich. 2000); Commonwealth v.
Barry, 454 A.2d 985, 988–89 (Pa. 1982).
64 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
65 Id.
66 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987).
67 562 N.E.2d 958, 964 (Ill. 1990); see also State v. Knight, 785 S.E.2d 324, 336 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2016) (“[A] factual understanding of the rights at issue must come together with an appre-
ciation of the relevance of those rights in the context of an unfolding interrogation. The
Constitution does not require that a suspect understand the full import of custodial interro-
gation, but before a waiver of rights can be intelligently made, one must understand both the
basic privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and the consequences of speaking freely
to law enforcement officials.”).
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Courts must therefore deduce the presence of a “requisite level of comprehension”
within the defendant at the time of waiver from “the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation” in order to deem it valid.68 Such deductions have come
to involve court assessments of myriad factors used to intuit a defendant’s cognizance
and mental capacity at the time of waiver.69 In line with the focus of this Article, this
subsection focuses on those facets related to a defendant’s cognitive ability and knowl-
edge, although additional aspects of a case relating to law enforcement conduct are
certainly relevant (e.g., the improper administration of a Miranda warning).70
A threshold matter for whether a waiver was knowledgeable and intelligent is
an individual’s ability to understand the form in which a Miranda warning is given.71
The language skills of a defendant are material in this regard: he cannot be aware of the
nature of his rights or the consequences of waiving them if this information is not pre-
sented in a language he understands.72 A defendant’s hearing and reading abilities are
similarly important, requiring that rights be advised in a comprehendible manner.73
But even if a rights advisement is fundamentally intelligible, courts accept that its
contents can be forgotten over time.74 Waivers provided during interrogations con-
ducted too long after a warning can be found invalid for lack of defendant knowledge
and intelligence.75 In addition, “[p]rior experience with the criminal justice system is
an important factor in determining whether the defendant made a knowing and
68 Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
69 See infra notes 70–79 and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1434–35 (11th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Dohm, 618 F.2d 1169, 1174–75 (5th Cir. 1980); People v. Braeseke, 602 P.2d 384, 390–91
(Cal. 1979), vacated and remanded by California v. Braeseke, 446 U.S. 932 (1980), re-
affirmed by People v. Braeseke, 618 P.2d 149 (Cal. 1980); Lee v. State, 12 A.3d 1238, 1247–51
(Md. 2011).
71 See United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining whether
a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, we consider, as one fac-
tor, any language difficulties encountered by the defendant during custodial interrogation.”).
72 E.g., United States v. Botello-Rosales, 728 F.3d 865, 867–68 (9th Cir. 2013); People
v. Aguilar-Ramos, 86 P.3d 397, 401–02 (Colo. 2004); People v. Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d
777, 780–82 (Colo. 1998); State v. Santiago, 542 N.W.2d 466, 471–73 (Wis. 1995).
73 E.g., Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 273 (6th Cir. 2009) (Moore, J., dissenting);
United States v. McForbes, 110 F. Supp. 3d 332, 337–38 (D. Mass. 2015); United States v.
Robles-Ramirez, 93 F. Supp. 2d 762, 764 (W.D. Tex. 2000); People v. Adames, 994 N.Y.S.2d
334, 338–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014); People v. Ripic, 587 N.Y.S.2d 776, 783 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992); State v. Hindsley, 614 N.W.2d 48, 56 (Wis. 2000).
74 See, e.g., Stumes v. Solem, 752 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1985); Ex parte Landrum, 57
So. 3d 77, 82–83 (Ala. 2010); In re Miah S., 861 N.W.2d 406, 412–15 (Neb. 2015).
75 E.g., United States v. Jones, 147 F. Supp. 2d 752, 761–62 (E.D. Mich. 2001); People v.
Quirk, 129 Cal. App. 3d 618, 626–32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Franklin v. State, 252 A.2d 487,
490–91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969); People v. Sanchez, 391 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517–18 (N.Y.
Trial Term 1977).
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intelligent waiver.”76 Courts view such experience as an indication that a defendant
already possessed some familiarity with his rights and the potential ramifications of
waiving them, and the absence of this background can signify the opposite.77
Finally, and most pertinent for this Article, “[a] defendant’s mental capacity
directly bears upon the question whether he understood the meaning of his Miranda
rights and the significance of waiving his constitutional rights.”78 In this vein, to
deduce a defendant’s cognitive ability to appreciate the warning, courts consider a
litany of individual characteristics, including: age, maturity, education, intelligence,
mental health, intoxication when warnings and waivers are given, and physical and
mental conditions when warnings and waivers are given.79 The proximity of warnings
and waivers to a violent arrest or other stressful event can also serve as a marker of
a defendant’s compromised physical and mental abilities at the time of waiver.80
C. Voluntary
A waiver is “voluntary” if “it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.”81 Such freedom and deliberation “de-
pend[s] on the absence of police overreaching, not on ‘free choice’ in any broader sense
of the word.”82 Thus, a prerequisite for a finding of “involuntary” is proof of measures,
physical or psychological, employed by law enforcement “calculated to break [a
defendant’s] will.”83 Focus can then shift to whether his “‘will [was] overborne and
his capacity for self-determination critically impaired’ because of coercive police
76 State v. Brown, 436 S.E.2d 163, 167 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Fincher, 305
S.E.2d 685, 697 (N.C. 1983); State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d 134, 151–53 (N.C. 1983)).
77 E.g., Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 934 (10th Cir. 2004); People v. Ferguson, 227
P.3d 510, 515 (Colo. 2010); Hawkins v. United States, 304 A.2d 279, 281 (D.C. 1973); State
v. Green, 655 So. 2d 272, 284 (La. 1995).
78 United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1998).
79 See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); Moore v. Ballone, 658 F.2d
218, 229 (4th Cir. 1981); Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Gonzalez, 719 F. Supp. 2d 167, 173 (D. Mass. 2010); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp.
909, 922–26 (D.D.C. 1988), reversed by United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
1988); People v. Whitson, 949 P.2d 18, 29–30 (Cal. 1998); People v. Knedler, 329 P.3d 242,
245–46 (Colo. 2014); State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 168 (Minn. 1997).
80 E.g., United States. v. Bennett, 604 F. App’x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2015); Gonzalez, 719 F.
Supp. 2d at 181; Whitson, 949 P.2d at 29.
81 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
82 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986); see also United States v. Sauseda, No.
MO-Q9-CR-252, 2011 WL 13137820, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2011) (“Without a finding of
law enforcement coercion, intimidation, or deception, a court cannot conclude that a waiver of
Miranda rights was involuntary because of a deficient mental condition or for any other
reason.” (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167; United States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 386–87
(5th Cir. 1989))).
83 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
312 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted).
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conduct.”84 Just as with determinations of knowledge and intelligence, “the totality
of the circumstances” must be evaluated.85
Plainly, the methods authorities utilize to elicit a waiver are of critical initial
import for determining whether said waiver was voluntary.86 But since the “volun-
tary” prong “primarily concerns the effect of police conduct”87 on a defendant’s “will”
and “capacity for self-determination,”88 mental competence can also be relevant, as
it pertains to an individual’s susceptibility to pressure.89
However, there exists disagreement among courts on this matter. A meaningful
cohort does not heed the Supreme Court’s language referencing suspects’ “will” and
individual “capacity” in waiver voluntariness assessments.90 The Ninth Circuit’s inter-
pretation in Cox v. Del Papa concisely articulates the reasoning behind this position:
The distinction between a claim that a Miranda waiver was not
voluntary, and a claim that such waiver was not knowing and
intelligent, is important. “The voluntariness of a waiver . . . has
always depended on the absence of police overreaching.” In
other words, the voluntariness component turns upon external
factors, whereas the cognitive component depends upon mental
84 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
It should be noted that by quoting Culombe, a pre-Miranda case, the Court appears to ex-
plicitly integrate the standard for a voluntary confession, implicitly invoked in Miranda, with
that for a voluntary waiver of one’s constitutional rights. See Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d
813, 820 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Connelly clearly holds that the ‘voluntariness’ inquiry in the Miranda
waiver context is equivalent to the voluntariness inquiry under the fourteenth amendment . . . .”),
overruled by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Com-
monwealth v. Jackson, 731 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Mass. 2000) (“The voluntariness of a Miranda
[sic] waiver and the voluntariness of a statement are separate and distinct inquiries, but the
‘totality of the circumstances’ test under each analysis is the same.” (citing Commonwealth
v. Edwards, 651 N.E.2d 398, 401 (Mass. 1995))).
85 Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
86 Spring, 479 U.S. at 574; Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170.
87 People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. 1993) (emphasis added).
88 Spring, 479 U.S. at 574 (quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163–64) (internal quotations
omitted).
89 E.g., State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Iowa 2006); State v. Mattox, 390 P.3d 514,
534 (Kan. 2017); Commonwealth v. Mandile, 492 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Mass. 1986); see also
United States v. Jensen, No. CR-08-50031, 2010 WL 11537913, at *22 (D.S.D. Feb. 12, 2010)
(“[T]he defendant’s mental state and ability to resist psychological pressure, as it relates to
police coercion, is relevant to the voluntariness inquiry.”).
90 See, e.g., Cox v. Del Papa, 542 F.3d 669, 675 (9th Cir. 2008); Edwards v. State, 842
P.2d 1281, 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); People v. Humphrey, 132 P.3d 352, 357–59 (Colo.
2006); Wagner v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-SC-0770-MR, 2005 WL 1199050, at *2–3 (Ky.
2005) (citing Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 482 (Ky. 1999)).
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capacity. Although courts often merge the two-pronged analysis,
the components should not be conflated.91
Yet a greater number of courts take defendant mental ability into account, appraising
it using the same factors for ascertaining knowledge and intelligence.92 And, identi-
cal to the knowing and intelligent inquiry, courts also consider the temporal distance
between warnings and waivers and a violent arrest or other stressful event when
determining defendant physical and mental capacity at the time of waiver.93
D. Discerning Cognitive Capacity
Cognitive capacity is relevant to all three prongs of whether an in-custody
waiver of one’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights is knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary. To deduce this characteristic, courts consider a number of variables of varying
accuracy.94 How they compare, balance, and rely on these factors has important
implications for the potential impact of research examining CEWs and cognition on
waiver assessments.
The evidence courts turn to can be divided into two categories. First, there is evi-
dence divorced from a defendant’s behavior at the time of waiver, or objective indicia
of mental acuity. Some of the main facts under this classification include age and
education—generally straightforward attributes that do not involve extensive inquiry
or approximating on the part of courts.95 Measurements of intoxication and intelligence
test results are also included. The former can be based on calculations of blood alcohol
content at or sufficiently near the time of waiver or a description of the amount of in-
toxicant consumed prior to it.96 This subcategory arguably includes medication that
91 542 F.3d at 675 (internal citation omitted).
92 That is, the factors they consider include: age, maturity, education, intelligence, mental
health, intoxication, when warnings and waivers are given, and physical and mental conditions
when warnings and waivers are given. See In re M.W., 731 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000) (“Although ‘voluntariness’ in the constitutional sense is distinct from the issue of
whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, the review of each issue includes many of the
same factors . . . .” (citing People v. Higgins, 607 N.E.2d 337, 345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993))).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Annis, 446 F.3d 852, 854, 856 (8th Cir. 2006).
94 See infra notes 94–110 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726 (1979); United States v. Sarsevicius, No.
3:15-CR-00091-TBR, 2016 WL 2993217, at *6 (W.D. Ky. May 23, 2016); Williamson v.
Hobbs, No. 5:14CV00240JLH-HDY, 2015 WL 925898, at *4–5 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 3, 2015);
In re S.B., 614 P.2d 786, 789 n.6 (Alaska 1980); State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 325 (Minn.
1997).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, No. 14-302(DWF/LIB), 2015 WL 144882, at *4
(D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2015); United States v. Vanzile, No. 2:11-cr-21, 2012 WL 1537420, at *1
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2012); People v. Knedler, 329 P.3d 242, 244 (Colo. 2014); Com-
monwealth v. Ward, 688 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Mass. 1997); Stevens v. State, 458 So. 2d 726,
727–29 (Miss. 1984).
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a defendant imbibed close in time to a waiver, which can impact cognition.97 With
regard to intelligence testing, defendants can take intelligence quotient (IQ) tests and
have their abilities represented by a score measured against a standard quantitative scale
of mental competence.98 Stressful events that a defendant experienced prior to waiver
that might have influenced his mental functioning can also affect an intelligence anal-
ysis. Courts tend to examine the magnitude of any experience and its temporal proxim-
ity to the waiver, as well as the severity of any injuries suffered by the defendant that
were present during interactions with law enforcement.99 And the results of mental
health evaluations conducted by professionals, though generally more complex and
subject to challenge than the facts previously noted, fall within this grouping as well,
with diagnoses, insights, and implications for defendant cognition presented to courts.100
A defendant’s history of interactions with law enforcement is also considered ob-
jective evidence. Such facts do not relate to cognitive capacity per se, but instead are
used by courts to indicate increased awareness of one’s rights and the consequences of
waiving them due to repeated exposure to Miranda warnings and the workings of
the criminal justice system.101 Even so, courts often weigh such a history against
facts that show a defendant possessing deficient mental acuity.102
97 See, e.g., United States v. Casellas, 149 F. Supp. 3d 222, 245 (D.N.H. 2016); United States
v. Keys, No. S-13-0082 KJM, 2014 WL 1232234, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2014); United
States v. Bogan, No. CR-10-00505-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 855670, at *1, *3, *5 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 10, 2011); Kalisz v. State, 124 So. 3d 185, 203–05 (Fla. 2013); Pruitt v. State, 834
N.E.2d 90, 115–17 (Ind. 2005).
98 See, e.g., Shields v. United States, 698 F. App’x 807, 811–12 (6th Cir. 2017); Bone v.
Polk, No. 1:04CV1074, 2010 WL 2733333, at *5 (M.D.N.C. July 9, 2010); United States v.
Goicochea-Perez, No. 4:05-CR-57-06-HLM-WEJ, 2007 WL 9672632, at *5 (N.D. Ga. May 23,
2007); Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F. Supp. 1429, 1431 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Rankin v. State, 1
S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ark. 1999).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Havlik, 710 F.3d 818, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Annis, 446 F.3d 852, 854, 856
(8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gonzalez, 719 F. Supp. 2d 167, 180–83 (D. Mass. 2010).
100 See, e.g., Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 263–71 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Granado, No. 09-471-6, 2012 WL 12888670, at *7–8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012); Lynch v.
Hudson, No. 2:07-cv-948, 2011 WL 4537890, at *61–67 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2011); Wacker
v. State, No. 96-3126-DES, 1999 WL 138901, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 1999); People v.
Cheatham, 551 N.W.2d 355, 359, 365 (Mich. 1996).
101 See Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of
Miranda, 47 DENV. L.J. 1, 20 (1970) (“A . . . background factor which has been used by judges
to impute knowledge to a suspect is his number of previous arrests and felony convictions. The
assumption here [is] that if the suspect has had a substantial number of previous experiences
with the criminal process, he will be more knowledgeable about his rights and more willing
to assert them.”). The study cited in this footnote finds that “those with fewer than eight
arrests made about the same number of statements as those with more, but those with less
than eight arrests had a slightly greater tendency to confess than those with more arrests,”
and “those with fewer previous felony convictions had a slightly greater tendency to make
statements and confessions than those with more previous felony convictions.” Id.
102 See, e.g., State v. Tothill, 586 P.2d 655, 657–58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); People v.
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The aforementioned evidence aimed at cognitive capacity is generally objec-
tively indicative of this quality. For example, a study found that participants whose
IQ test scores categorized them as intellectually disabled were unable to understand
Miranda warnings.103 Moreover, some whose scores slightly exceed that which
typically demarks intellectual disability were also unable to understand the warn-
ings.104 Such research has been conducted with regard to a number of other factors
as well.105 Another study found that psychiatric patients performed only slightly
better than those who were intellectually disabled in terms of understanding Miranda
warnings.106 And a third found that, “as a class, juveniles younger than fifteen do not
understand at least some of their Miranda rights.”107
Nevertheless, these types of facts are often discounted by courts in waiver
determinations in favor of a second category of evidence: direct observations of
defendant appearance and behavior at the time of waiver,108 or subjective indicia of
mental acuity. Courts routinely base appraisals of defendants’ cognitive abilities on
the individuals’ conduct when they waived their rights, paying attention to such
things as temperament, tone, manifestations of confusion, comments indicating
understanding, and apparent reasoning ability.109 In so doing, courts may rely on
Thames, 344 P.3d 891, 896–97, 897 n.6 (Colo. 2015); People v. Pond, 629 N.Y.S.2d 111,
112–13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). It has even been argued that “prior criminal experience can
be a valid proxy for the knowledge and intelligence necessary to waive one’s Fifth Amendment
rights to silence and counsel.” Thomas P. Windom, Note, The Writing on the Wall: Miranda’s
“Prior Criminal Experience” Exception, 92 VA. L. REV. 327, 331 (2006).
103 Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 501 (2002).
104 Id.
105 See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1564–74
(2008) (providing a summary of research on the effects of certain factors on Miranda warning
comprehension, such as age, education, reading ability, and mental health).
106 Virginia G. Cooper & Patricia A. Zapf, Psychiatric Patients’ Comprehension of Miranda
Rights, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 390, 400–01 (2008).
107 Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1160 (1980).
108 See, e.g., Smith v. Duckworth, 824 F.3d 1233, 1247–48 (10th Cir. 2016); Bone v. Polk,
441 F. App’x 193, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Turner, 157 F.3d 552, 555–56
(8th Cir. 1998); Moore v. Dugger, 856 F.2d 129, 134–35 (11th Cir. 1988); Byrd v. State, 78
So.3d 445, 454 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009); People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 836, 838 (Colo.
2009); see also United States v. Spencer, 995 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Whether a waiver is
‘knowing and voluntary’ is a question directed to a defendant’s state of mind, which can be
inferred from his actions and statements.” (emphasis added)); Cloud et al., supra note 103, at
527–31 (observing patterns in the factors that courts utilize to determine waiver validity, includ-
ing the consistent discounting of intelligence (as revealed by IQ testing), age, and education).
109 See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also People v. Bernasco, 562 N.E.2d
958, 966 (Ill. 1990) (“The trial court here reached its conclusion after hearing police, parental,
and psychological testimony and—what is very significant—making its own observations of
defendant while he was testifying.” (emphasis added)).
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recordings, transcripts, or the testimony of authorities present at the time.110 Courts
give substantial weight to this category of evidence, and are rarely moved by ob-
jective indicia unless they clearly evince a defendant with severely compromised
cognitive faculties.111
The current landscape of court assessments of mental capacity and the influence
of this factor on findings of waiver validity presents a high bar for studies of CEWs
and cognitive capacity to scale in order to meaningfully impact waiver determina-
tions, let alone motivate a per se rule shielding those struck by these devices from
law enforcement questioning for a set amount of time post-strike. The small number
of published court orders and opinions addressing CEWs in waiver assessments help
illuminate this predicament.112
E. Conducted Electrical Weapons Cases
The argument that being struck by a CEW might compromise an individual’s
mental processes—and thereby her ability to issue a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of her constitutional rights—appears only relatively recently in
published court rulings. This is somewhat surprising given the common knowledge
that brain function is electrically modulated and that CEWs incapacitate individuals
by way of electrical current.113 This subsection presents the small stable of published
court orders and opinions in which this argument is broached.114
To begin with, in State v. Sudduth, the defendant was involved in a high-speed
chase following a robbery.115 When his vehicle was finally stopped, he attempted to
flee on foot, but was tackled by a police officer.116 Sudduth continued resisting so
110 See, e.g., Duckworth, 824 F.3d at 1248; Bernasco, 562 N.E.2d at 968.
111 See, e.g., United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 537–39 (9th Cir. 1998); Cooper v.
Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142, 1144–46 (5th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Crosby, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1285,
1308–09 (S.D. Fla. 2003); United States v. Robles-Ramirez, 93 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766–68
(W.D. Texas 2000); T.S.D. v. State, 741 So.2d 1142, 1143–44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
112 See infra Section I.E.
113 The devices and their effects are frequently addressed with regard to law enforcement
use of excessive force and the Fourth Amendment, and have been for some time. See, e.g.,
Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F. App’x 491, 491 (6th Cir. 2012); Brown v. City of
Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495, 500 (8th Cir. 2009); McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 738
F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 1990). See generally, e.g.,Bailey Jennifer Woolfstead, Don’t
Tase Me Bro: A Lack of Jurisdictional Consensus Across Circuit Lines, 29 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 285 (2013); Aaron Sussman, Comment, Shocking the Conscience: What Police TASERs
and Weapon Technology Reveal About Excessive Force Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1342 (2012).
114 Defendants have also raised the argument that CEW strikes prevented them from
making voluntary statements and confessions. See, e.g., United States v. Stoner, 466 F.
App’x 720, 725–29 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bohanon, 629 F. Supp. 2d 802, 824
(E.D. Tenn. 2009); United States v. Irons, 646 F. Supp. 2d 927, 964–65 (E.D. Tenn. 2009).
115 No. 93,633, 2006 WL 90102, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2006).
116 Id.
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officers struck him twice with a TASER.117 On the drive to a police station, he made
unprompted incriminating statements.118 Once at the station, officers administered
a Miranda warning and the defendant waived his rights and confessed.119 At a
suppression hearing, arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily
waive his constitutional rights, Sudduth “testified that on the day of the robbery he
had not eaten since 9 a.m., had consumed a half pint of vodka and smoked a ‘wet’
cigarette (a cigarette dipped in PCP and embalming fluid), and was thinking slower
than normal because of the multiple Taser [sic] stuns.”120 The trial court, however,
dismissed these claims, finding that the defendant testified “that he understood his
rights and that he had waived them,” and that his behavior when he waived his
rights indicated knowledge and intelligence.121 The court also concluded that the
conditions of the interrogation and the defendant’s apparent cognitive abilities
showed that his waiver was voluntary.122 The waiver was therefore validated, and
the appellate court affirmed the ruling.123
In United States v. Chancellor, the defendant was seen by a police officer selling
narcotics.124 When the officer moved to arrest him, he pushed the officer’s arm away
and attempted to flee.125 The officer gave chase and “deployed his Taser [sic], which
stuck Chancellor in his back and shoulder. Chancellor fell to the ground, ending up
on his back. When the five second [sic] electric current concluded, the officer directed
Chancellor not to move, and Chancellor complied.”126
The TASER was deployed at 12:39 p.m.127 After going to a hospital where a doctor
removed the TASER’s darts from the defendant’s body, he was brought to a police
station and placed in a holding cell at 4:39 p.m., where he was administered a
Miranda warning, waived his rights, and confessed.128 At a suppression hearing,
Chancellor argued that his waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent “because of his
extremely low IQ, and because at the time he was read those rights he was very intoxi-
cated by drugs and alcohol, sleep-deprived and suffering from the effects of having
been Tasered [sic].”129 In detail, the court explains its sympathy for the low IQ score





121 Id. at *2.
122 Id.
123 Id. at *3.
124 No. 07-20578-CR, 2008 WL 622937, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2008).
125 Id.
126 Id. (internal citation omitted).
127 Id.
128 Id. at *2–3.
129 Id. at *10.
130 Id. at *11–13.
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Chancellor also argues that the Tasering [sic] further compromised
his ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights,
and relies upon Dr. Seely’s opinion that “I think the electrical
shock through the brain further compromised his already com-
promised state.” Dr. Seely acknowledged that he has not re-
searched the effect of Tasers [sic] on cognitive function. Further,
it is undisputed that the Defendant was not questioned until four
hours after he was Tasered [sic]. While Dr. Seely’s opinion on
this point could have basis in fact, on this record, this Court
gives it very little weight.131
Nevertheless, based on the defendant’s other arguments, the court found that the
defendant’s waiver was not valid and suppressed his statements.132
In United States v. Mack, the defendant was pulled over on a highway under
suspicion of trafficking narcotics.133 When one of the two officers present, after
receiving permission from Mack, looked in the defendant’s trunk and found cocaine
and a firearm, he proceeded to place Mack under arrest.134 The defendant, however,
fled on foot, and the second officer pursued.135 After several hundred feet, Mack fell
to the ground, at which point the pursuing officer repeatedly ordered him to remain
there.136 But the defendant refused, so the officer deployed his TASER.137 At this
point, the court’s recitation of the facts is a bit odd. It states that Mack was hit “in
the arm with one of [the TASER’s two] probes.”138 But in order for the device to
introduce an electrical current into a subject, both darts must embed.139 It is therefore
unclear if Mack experienced a true TASER strike or was simply struck by one of the
device’s darts. Continuing, the court describes the defendant ending up on the
ground again as a result of this strike.140 He continued resisting, however, and the
officer administered the TASER two more times, but in “drive stun” mode.141 In this
mode, the device is placed directly against someone and elicits pain, but does not
introduce electrical current into the body.142 The court, however, appears to treat all
three applications of the TASER identically, stating, “Each burst from a taser [sic]
lasts five seconds, unless the officer keeps his finger on the trigger. [The officer]’s
131 Id. at *14 (internal citations omitted).
132 Id.






139 See infra Section II.B.2.
140 Mack, 2009 WL 580430, at *1.
141 Id.
142 See infra notes 215–20 and accompanying text.
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taser [sic] administered two five second [sic] electrical bursts, each burst carrying
between .0021 and .0036 amps. The third burst lasted six seconds.”143
But these specifications only apply to ranged TASER strikes in which a device’s
darts shoot out, lodge in a suspect, and conduct electrical current through him.144
There was apparently only one TASER administration of this sort: the first.145 The
next two did not involve electrical current flowing through the defendant, so the fact
that the third lasted six seconds is only relevant in so far as it describes how long
Mack experienced pain from being exposed to the device in drive stun mode.146 The
court’s lack of understanding aside, the officer that subdued Mack administered a
Miranda warning as they returned to the parked cars, after which the defendant
confessed.147 At a suppression hearing, Mack argued that the TASER strikes “rendered
him incapable of understanding his rights under Miranda or of effectively waiving
those rights” and “created a coercive environment such that his subsequent confes-
sion was not free and voluntary.”148 The court, however, heeded the testimony of
two officers, including the one who subdued Mack, who put forth:
[D]uring training in the use of the taser [sic], officers, including
themselves, experienced pain while the taser [sic] was used
against them. They also testified, however, that after the bursts
of electricity from the taser [sic] discharged into their bodies
stopped, the pain they experienced during those discharges ended
immediately, and they were able to function normally.149
The court also notes, “Mr. Mack does not submit supporting case law or evi-
dence indicating that administration of a taser [sic] renders the recipient incompetent
for any amount of time.”150 It therefore found that “the bursts of electricity were
short and sufficient enough to enable the defendant to understand and comply with
commands.”151 Based on this finding and two more (that Mack did not behave
abnormally when he waived his rights and that the amount of force used was
143 Mack, 2009 WL 580430, at *1.
144 See infra Section II.B.2.
145 Mack, 2009 WL 580430, at *1.
146 See Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that, in
“dart mode,” a TASER discharges from a distance and “embed[s] . . . barbed electrical probe[s]”
in the target, and a “powerful electrical pulse [is] delivered” causing her “to lose . . . muscu-
lar control,” whereas “[t]he use of the [TASER] in drive-stun mode is painful, certainly, but
also temporary and localized, without incapacitating muscle contractions”); see also infra
notes 215–20 and accompanying text.
147 Mack, 2009 WL 580430, at *1.
148 Id. at *3.
149 Id. at n.11.
150 Id. at n.9.
151 Id. at *3.
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appropriate), the court concluded that the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelli-
gent, and voluntary.152
In United States v. Patterson, the defendant was approached by a police officer
after the latter observed what he believed to be the defendant dropping a firearm into
a car’s open window upon noticing the officer.153 When the defendant continued
hurriedly walking away after repeated entreaties to halt, the officer “deployed his
Taser [sic] weapon, striking Defendant in the upper left shoulder and middle to
lower right side of his back. Upon receiving the single, five second [sic] blast of
electricity from the Taser [sic], Defendant fell to the ground” and was arrested.154
Emergency medical personnel were called to attend to Patterson, and the officer
procured the firearm from the car while they arrived and did this.155 Once the para-
medics left, the officer administered a Miranda warning and asked if the defendant
would speak to him without an attorney present.156 Patterson agreed and, shortly
thereafter, confessed to owning the firearm and that it was procured illegally.157 At
a suppression hearing, the defendant argued that he did not make a knowing,
intelligent, or voluntary waiver “because the effects of the Taser [sic] discharge on
his person and his asserted state of intoxication.”158 The court clarifies, “Defendant
appears to argue the Taser [sic] discharge and his alleged intoxication interfered
with his mental capacity to appreciate the consequences of waiving his rights.”159
However, based on Patterson’s behavior at the time he waived and his prior experi-
ence with the criminal justice system, it found this assertion unpersuasive,160 noting
with regard to the TASER strike:
[Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office] training specialist Larry Monts,
who himself has been tased on more than one occasion and has
discharged the Taser [sic] on other officers in training approxi-
mately 1200 times, testified that electrical charge generated from
the Taser [sic] affects the muscle tissue, but it does not affect the
brain. Mr. Monts further stated that no one he has tased has ever
lost cognitive function, or the ability to speak and otherwise
communicate rationally. In his opinion, even if a person had
been drinking alcohol the Taser [sic] would not have a different
effect on the person tased. Mr. Monts testified he had read the
152 Id.
153 No. 3:09-cr-7(S1)-J-32TEM, 2009 WL 10670083, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2009).
154 Id. at *1–2 (internal citation omitted).
155 Id. at *2.
156 Id.
157 Id. at *2–3.
158 Id. at *4.
159 Id. at *6.
160 Id. at *7.
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available research literature from Taser [sic] International and
those studies report these same findings.161
Based on his behavior at the time of waiver, the court ultimately found that the
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.162
Finally, in United States v. Jackson, the defendant was seen by police officers
striking a woman in a car.163 When he refused to stop after being ordered to, an
officer “deployed his taser [sic], striking the man. The man fell out of the [vehicle]
and was placed under arrest.”164 Marijuana and ecstasy were found in the defen-
dant’s pockets.165 After being brought to a police station, a Miranda warning was
given to Jackson, who waived his rights and then confessed.166 At a suppression
hearing, the defendant argued that “after having been subjected to a 50,000-volt
taser [sic], [he] was in no condition to voluntarily waive anything.”167 (It should be
noted that TASERs actually subject targets to electrical currents with voltages far
less than 50,000 volts.)168 But one of the arresting officers
testified concerning the effects of a taser [sic]. [He] stated that
the taser [sic] application is painful during the five seconds that
it is on, but that after the five seconds there is no pain to the taser
[sic] recipient. [He] had been tased at his own request. He re-
ported, “As soon as the tasing, the actual shock stops, you feel
a moment of relief. But the pain doesn’t continue, no, sir.”169
As a result of this testimony and the defendant’s actions when he waived his rights
and after, “[t]he court finds that there is no evidence that the defendant’s will was
overborne, either by his experience with the taser [sic] or from alcohol that he may
have consumed.”170
The cases above largely see courts following the path presented in the previous sub-
section: valuing evidence of a defendant’s appearance and behavior at the time of
waiver over metrics divorced from the interaction in question. In the one case where
this did not occur, Chancellor, the fact that the defendant experienced a TASER strike
prior to his invalidated waiver had almost no influence on the court’s determination.171
161 Id. at *6 (internal citations omitted).
162 Id. at *8.
163 No. 1:08CR00076SNLJ, 2010 WL 254927, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2010).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at *1–2.
167 Id. at *3.
168 See infra Section II.B.2.
169 Jackson, 2010 WL 254927, at *3.
170 Id. at *5.
171 United States v. Chancellor, 2008 WL 622937, at *1–14 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2008).
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This shows that research on CEWs and cognition must clearly reveal substantial im-
pairment if it is to meaningfully influence courts, and length of impairment matters
greatly given the wide disparities in the times between CEW strikes and waivers.
However, along with demonstrating encumbrances that studies of CEWs and
cognition face in influencing courts, the cases above make apparent the need for a bet-
ter understanding of CEWs in the legal community and in legal contexts. A number
of decisions evince glaring knowledge failings when it comes to CEW technology.
Mack displays a lack of appreciation for the differences between the dart and drive-
stun modes of TASERs, which matter immensely in terms of whether electrical
current is introduced into the body (it is with the former and is not with the latter)
and what an individual experiences.172 And Jackson presents TASERs as subjecting
targets to 50,000-volt electrical currents, a figure significantly above the actual
voltage emitted.173
There are also issues with who testifies as an expert when it comes to CEWs. In
Chancellor, a psychiatrist with no special knowledge of CEWs stated, “I think the
electrical shock through the brain further compromised his already compromised
state.”174 To its credit, the court gives “very little weight” to this testimony.175 But
in Mack, Patterson, and Jackson, police officers who have been tased as part of their
training, tased others during training, or “read the available research literature” from
the company that makes TASERs offered testimony on the effects of these devices
that appears to have been accorded great weight.176 While hearing about CEW
impacts from those who have experienced them is helpful, the perspectives of these
individuals should be at least somewhat discounted for several reasons: the officers
were tased in controlled, nonconfrontational settings after which they were more
than likely not required to engage in complex mental or physical tasks; they have
not conducted peer-reviewed research on the effects of CEWs, nor did they base
their opinions on any such works; they have no specialized knowledge of the actual
mechanism by which CEWs incapacitate subjects or whether it might have addi-
tional effects; and they are biased information sources.
Despite these issues, the fact that the cases above cluster between 2006 and
2010 may lead some to argue that research examining whether CEWs meaningfully
impact mental acuity, and therefore the ability to knowingly, intelligently, and vol-
untarily waive his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, is not overly necessary. But
most court evidentiary rulings are not published or catalogued by legal research
172 See infra notes 217–22 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B.2.
173 See infra Section II.B.2.
174 2008 WL 622937, at *14 (internal quotations omitted).
175 Id.
176 United States v. Patterson, No. 3:09-cr-7(S1)-J-32 TEM, 2009 WL 10670083, at *6
(M.D. Fla. June 22, 2009); United States v. Mack, No. 07-238, 2009 WL 580430, at * 3
(M.D. La. Mar. 6, 2009); United States v. Jackson, No. 1:08CR00076SNLJ, 2010 WL
254927, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2010).
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services. Moreover, the ubiquity of CEWs and CEW use in law enforcement tells
a different story. These devices are carried by most police officers in America
(ninety percent by one estimate)177 and are frequently discharged against suspects
(perhaps 300,000 times per year).178 CEWs touch scores of lives annually, and effort
should be expended to ensure that these individuals are able to exercise their con-
stitutional rights and the criminal legal system is functioning in a just manner.
In addition, as expounded upon below, researchers examining CEWs and
cognition present findings that they claim militate towards per se legal rules shield-
ing suspects who have been tased from questioning for a set amount of time.179 And
this work is beginning to be cited by courts.180 Given the widespread use of CEWs
in law enforcement, it is more than likely that enterprising defense counsel will
begin to frequently turn to this research. Providing practitioners with the tools to
accurately present and appraise this work is therefore a valuable endeavor.
II. CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS
CEWs administer electrical current to the bodies of targets. Since the brain
mediates the mind and the function of the brain is mediated by electrical forces,181
it is intuitive to think that CEWs might have some influence on cognition. And
given the widespread diffusion of these devices throughout law enforcement, this
potential influence may impact a significant number of individuals’ ability to
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. This section seeks to add clarity to the aforementioned conjecture by present-
ing the history of CEWs, how they work, and an in-depth examination of the state
of research on these devices and cognition and its legal implications.
177 Matt Stroud, One Company Supplies Tasers to Virtually Every Police Department in the
U.S., CITYLAB (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/12/one-company-supplies
-tasers-to-virtually-every-police-department-in-the-us/420369/ [https://perma.cc/57E8-RU5V].
178 Sarah Kaufman, Law Enforcement Agencies Use Tasers over 300,000 Times a Year,
VOCATIV (June 1, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.vocativ.com/197340/law-enforcement-agen
cies-use-tasers-over-300000-times-a-year/index.html [https://perma.cc/CG3P-5MGA].
179 Kane & White, supra note 22, at 100–01.
180 See Morris v. State, 554 S.W.3d 98, 106–07 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018) (citing such recent
research on CEWs and cognition favorably when describing potential harms in a case where
a trial judge forced a defendant to wear a “shock belt” during trial and activated it to elec-
trically shock him to maintain court decorum).
181 See, e.g., JOSEPH LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF: HOW OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE
47 (2002) (describing the electrical aspects of neuronal activity and communication); STEVEN
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 41 (2002) (“One can
say that information-processing activity of the brain causes the mind, or one can say that it
is the mind, but in either case the evidence is overwhelming that every aspect of our mental
lives depends entirely on physiological events in the tissues of the brain.”).
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A. A Brief History
The first electrical devices deployed as weapons by American law enforcement
were electric cattle prods, used by officers against civil rights demonstrators in the
1960s.182 Around since the late 1890s,183 these simple devices, consisting of two
prongs at the end of a long barrel, deliver an electric shock to the target.184 They do not
incapacitate a subject, but rather induce movement or compliance through the elicita-
tion of pain at a localized area of the body, and they cannot accurately be described as
conducted electrical weapons because electricity is not conducted through the target.185
In the mid-twentieth century, police officers’ use of electric cattle prods, called
“shock batons,” and other “non-lethal” means of crowd control such as water cannons
stoked public outrage and led to calls for the employment of less brutal methods.186
Addressing public safety and law enforcement methods, President Lyndon John-
son’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in its seminal
1967 report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, called for non-lethal weap-
ons suitable for deployment in situations that might otherwise call for the use of a
gun.187 Such a “weapon should be immediately available and ready for instant use”
and “must incapacitate its victim at least as fast as a gun.”188 In addition, it should
have “little risk of permanent injury to the individual who is the target.”189
The report reached an enterprising National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion physicist named John Cover, who, a few days later, read a newspaper article
reporting on “a man who had inadvertently walked into an electrified fence and sur-
vived, though he was temporarily immobilized.”190 Inspired by these works, Cover
conceived a device in 1969 that uses electricity to attain the results sought by the
182 E.g., DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 227–29 (2007); Melissa Mann, Police
History: How a NASA Scientist Invented the TASER, POLICE ONE (Mar. 21, 2016), https://
www.policeone.com/police-products/less-lethal/TASER/articles/164475006-Police-History
-How-a-NASA-scientist-invented-the-TASER/ [https://perma.cc/34AF-48W2].
183 See U.S. Patent No. 427,549, at [26–29, 39] (filed Mar. 18, 1890) (patenting an “electric
prod-pole” for the purpose of “excit[ing] cattle to cause them to move forward” by way of
an “electric shock”).
184 REJALI, supra note 182, at 229; Sarah Stone, Who Invented the TASER?, TODAY I
FOUND OUT (Oct. 7, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2014/10/in
vented-taser/ [https://perma.cc/YSL7-6BV9].
185 REJALI, supra note 182, at 229; Stone, supra note 184.
186 SEANTEL ANAÏS, DISARMING INTERVENTION: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF NON-LETHALITY
127 (2015); Mann, supra note 182.
187 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF




190 Bruce Weber, Jack Cover, 88, Physicist Who Invented the Taser Stun Gun, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/us/16cover.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/G7ZV-QSQ3]; see REJALI, supra note 182, at 231–32.
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Johnson Administration: a weapon that fires two barbed darts into a subject, each con-
nected to a handheld portion by two wires through which an electric current is delivered
to the target.191 In honor of the novel Tom Swift and His Electric Rifle, in which the pro-
tagonist invents an electric rifle that shoots bolts of electricity, Cover named the device
the “Thomas Swift Electric Rifle,” and initially referred to it as the “T.S.E.R.”192 This,
however, became cumbersome, so he added an “A” and it became the “TASER.”193
With a viable prototype in hand by 1970, Cover formed a company called TASER
Systems and reached out extensively to law enforcement, military, and civilian actors
building awareness and interest, ultimately catching the receptive ear of the airline
industry in 1971.194 Airplane hijacking experienced its heyday in the 1960s and
1970s due to global political tumult and lax passenger screening,195 but potential
protective measures recommended at the time, such as placing more law enforce-
ment officers on flights and arming airline employees, were limited by the fact that
projectile weapons (e.g., guns) are an extremely unsafe security tool onboard an
aircraft.196 Tethered darts that administer electricity, however, pose far less risk to
innocents and the integrity of the plane itself.197 But one important detail still caused
trepidation on the part of airlines and investors: TASERs of the time used explosive
propellant, like guns, to launch their darts, possibly subjecting them to stringent
government firearms regulations that would severely limit their marketing and po-
tential use on airplanes.198 Cover therefore approached the Treasury Department—one
of the relevant federal offices—on this matter and convinced officials not to classify
TASERs as firearms (it was classified as a gun, but not a firearm).199
Despite Cover’s initial success with regulators, other events precipitated the quick
evaporation of airline interest in his product.200 In 1973, the Nixon Administration
191 REJALI, supra note 182, at 231–32; see also U.S. Patent No. 4,253,132 (filed Dec. 29,
1977); U.S. Patent No. 3,803,463 (filed July 10, 1972). Interestingly, patent examiners initially
deemed Cover’s invention anticipated by a patent from the early 1850s covering an “Electric
Whaling Apparatus,” which is essentially a CEW for use on whales that delivers electrical
current through a modified harpoon. Robert A. Stratbucker, The Scientific History, in TASER
CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS: PHYSIOLOGY, PATHOLOGY, AND LAW 19 (Mark W. Kroll
& Jeffrey D. Ho eds., 2009); see U.S. Patent No. 8,843 (filed Sept. 26, 1851).
192 Weber, supra note 190. See generally APPLETON, supra note 7.
193 Weber, supra note 190.
194 REJALI, supra note 182, at 233.
195 JEFFREY C. PRICE & JEFFREY S. FORREST, PRACTICAL AVIATION SECURITY: PRE-
DICTING AND PREVENTING FUTURE THREATS 53–55 (3d ed. 2016).
196 Greg Meyer, Conducted Electrical Weapons: A User’s Perspective, in TASER CON-
DUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS: PHYSIOLOGY, PATHOLOGY, AND LAW, supra note 191, at
2; REJALI, supra note 182, at 233.
197 Meyer, supra note 196.
198 REJALI, supra note 182, at 233.
199 JOHN MURRAY & BARNET RESNICK, A GUIDE TO TASER TECHNOLOGY: STUNGUNS,
LIES AND VIDEOTAPE 26 (1997).
200 Id. at 32–33.
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mandated new, more effective passenger screening procedures, including the use of
electronic search equipment.201 This development ended the scourge of plane hijack-
ings, obviating airline need for the TASER.202 Over the next few years, however,
Cover successfully pivoted to selling to individuals, private security firms, and
police.203 But outside forces again worked against his success, this time more directly.
By 1975, criminal use of TASERs prompted police to raise their voices in opposition
to the relatively unregulated sale of these devices, with the gun industry and Na-
tional Rifle Association joining the chorus.204 The same year, California and New
Jersey classified the weapon as a firearm, requiring that each one sold be registered and
purchasers be licensed.205 And by the end of the year, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) halted all sales in order to conduct further safety testing.206
Yet by early 1976, the CPSC was satisfied with the safety of the TASER and
rescinded its ban.207 Nevertheless, the Treasury Department changed course and
classified the weapon as a firearm, not just a gun as before, and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms followed suit.208 This subjected TASERs to strin-
gent regulations: they could only be sold at gun shops, the Department of State had
to approve all overseas sales, and foreign clients needed their government’s approval
for purchases.209 Cover’s prearranged deals were killed and the foreign market
dissipated.210 With police departments still uninterested in the product, TASER
Systems hemorrhaged investors and was steadily collapsing in the late 1970s.211
The decline would halt with the extension of a lifeline in 1979.212 As a result of
widespread accusations of police brutality, related soaring litigation costs, and
individual incidents of officer violence that commanded national media attention,
the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) took another look at the TASER (having
previously rejected it twice).213 The Department ultimately adopted the weapon in
1981, but device issues revealed through extensive real world use demanded
substantial design and production alterations that ultimately led Cover’s TASER
201 Fred Ferretti, Zap!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1976, at 13, https://www.nytimes.com/1976/01
/04/archives/zap.html.
202 REJALI, supra note 182, at 234.
203 Id.
204 Id.; Ferretti, supra note 201, at 13.
205 REJALI, supra note 182, at 234; Ferretti, supra note 201, at 13.
206 REJALI, supra note 182, at 234; Stratbucker, supra note 191, at 19–20.
207 REJALI, supra note 182, at 234; Stratbucker, supra note 191, at 19–20.
208 REJALI, supra note 182, at 234–35; see also 27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (1976).
209 MURRAY & RESNICK, supra note 199, at 31.
210 REJALI, supra note 182, at 235.
211 MURRAY & RESNICK, supra note 199, at 32; REJALI, supra note 182, at 235.
212 REJALI, supra note 182, at 235–36.
213 Id.; Meyer, supra note 196, at 3; Elaine Woo, Jack Cover Dies at 88; Scientist Invented
the Taser Stun Gun, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local
/obituaries/la-me-jack-cover13-2009feb13-story.html [https://perma.cc/KJ8V-XWLC].
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Systems to declare bankruptcy in the mid-1980s.214 It sold all of its interests to
investors, who continued operating the company as Tasertron beginning in 1986.215
Tasertron exclusively supplied police, security, and military agencies, including
continuing to supply the LAPD.216
As a quick aside to clarify technology and terminology, around the time of
TASER Systems’ demise, companies marketing commercial “stun guns” appeared.217
Akin to the electric cattle prods mentioned above,218 such devices are not range wea-
pons and must be physically pressed against targets, inducing compliance through
the elicitation of pain rather than incapacitation.219 Stun gun companies benefitted
from the awareness of electrical weapons that Cover cultivated, and both directly
and indirectly used the well-known TASER brand to market their products despite
critical differences.220 In addition, stun guns are far less complicated and therefore
less expensive than TASERs, and, despite their name, are not regulated as guns
since they do not fire projectiles, thereby avoiding the strict sales limitations that
applied to TASERs of the time.221 The aforementioned tactics and advantages helped
stun gun companies find success selling to both police and the broader public.222
Turning back to CEWs, Tasertron was the predominant provider of these weapons
for a number of years following its formation from the ashes of TASER Systems.223
But troubles plagued its products, severely limiting demand.224 The devices suffered
many technical and design problems and often failed to operate correctly in the field,
not to mention extensive officer misuse and abuse.225 In addition, contrary to expec-
tations, Tasertron’s most important customer, the LAPD, experienced increased civil
liability claims and payments, increased personnel complaints, and a diminished
public image.226 The most famous incident occurred in 1991 and involved LAPD
officers deploying a Tasertron TASER twice against an African-American man
named Rodney King.227 When this failed to subdue him, it was assumed King was
on the drug Phencyclidine (PCP), thought to make users especially tenacious and
214 NEIL DAVISON, ‘NON-LETHAL’ WEAPONS 34 (2009); REJALI, supra note 182, at 236–37.
215 DAVISON, supra note 214, at 34.
216 Id.
217 REJALI, supra note 182, at 242–44; Paul C. Nystrom, The Conducted Electrical Weapon:
Historical Overview of the Technology, in ATLAS OF CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPON
WOUNDS AND FORENSIC ANALYSIS 1–6 (Jeffrey D. Ho et al. eds., 2012).
218 See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.
219 REJALI, supra note 182, at 243; Nystrom, supra note 217, at 1–6.
220 REJALI, supra note 182, at 243.
221 Id. at 243–44.
222 DAVISON, supra note 214, at 34; REJALI, supra note 182, at 243–44.
223 DAVISON, supra note 214, at 34; REJALI, supra note 182, at 247.
224 REJALI, supra note 182, at 236–37.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 246.
227 Id. at 245–46.
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less responsive to CEWs.228 The officers then proceeded to beat King with metal
batons, particularly severely since they thought he possessed the added strength of
someone on PCP.229 This assumption proved false,230 and it turned out that the TASER
model utilized was actually less powerful than previous incarnations, producing
numerous failures to incapacitate suspects in the field.231 Police officers lost confi-
dence in TASERs and the number of departments and agencies using the devices
plummeted throughout the 1990s.232
As Tasertron’s fortunes diminished, those of another CEW company rose.233 In
1993, two brothers, Tom and Rick Smith, contacted Cover in the hopes of producing
a CEW that could be more easily marketed to the general public.234 Cover conveyed
that the key was avoiding the onerous federal regulations applied to firearms.235
Working out of Cover’s garage, and funded by family members, the brothers quickly
produced a prototype the same year that utilized compressed nitrogen to fire its darts,
as opposed to gunpowder.236 This change did the trick, and, in November 1993, regula-
tors confirmed that the new product, also called a TASER, was not a firearm and not
subject to corresponding stringent marketing limitations.237 The brothers, along with
their father, founded Air TASER and proceeded to market their new device.238
But public demand for Air TASER products failed to materialize.239 Moreover,
Air TASER was barred from marketing to domestic law enforcement and military
agencies as a result of a legal run-in with Tasertron.240 Tasertron, possessing the
228 Lou Cannon, The King Incident: More than Met the Eye on Videotape, WASH. POST
(Jan. 25, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/01/25/the-king-inci
dent-more-than-met-the-eye-on-videotape/2248e35e-178b-47e9-a8db-0734f88b46e0/?utm
_term=.2ff770b52d82 [https://perma.cc/6LGB-2LB5].
229 REJALI, supra note 182, at 246.
230 Id.
231 Meyer, supra note 196, at 4.
232 REJALI, supra note 182, at 246; Meyer, supra note 196, at 4.
233 Woo, supra note 213.
234 Id.
235 Lisa Girion, The Garage Science Behind the Stun Gun that Changed Policing, REUTERS




238 Michael Joseph Gross, Shock and Ow!, GQ (July 6, 2010), https://www.gq.com/story
/shock-ow-taser-protector-axon-company-profile [https://perma.cc/V6LK-5BNA]; Ed Taylor,
Scottsdale’s Taser Turns a Police Tool into a Profit-Making Machine, EAST VALLEY TRIB.
(Apr. 11, 2004), https://www.eastvalleytribune.com/money/scottsdale-s-taser-turns-a-police
-tool-into-a-profit/article_f95f04f5-1c5d-5463-b9db-d0e6486f4dc8.html [https://perma.cc
/ZMS2-YEXN].
239 Taylor, supra note 238; see also Susan K. Williams et al., TASER International, Inc.—
Grappling with Growth, 2 CASE J. 25, 35–36 (2006).
240 Williams et al., supra note 239, at 32.
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rights to Cover’s patents, quickly sued Air TASER for infringement.241 Without the
resources to engage in a protracted legal dispute, Air TASER settled, agreeing not
to sell to U.S. law enforcement and military entities until 1998, when the relevant
patent expired.242 Air TASER could still market to such groups overseas, but failed
to stimulate interest.243
As the years went by during which Air TASER’s non-compete agreement with
Tasertron was in effect, the company amassed significant debt.244 However, it spent
this time redesigning its signature product, creating a more effective CEW.245 In
2000, two years after the non-compete agreement expired and having rebranded
itself as TASER International, the company launched the TASER M26 and aggres-
sively targeted U.S. law enforcement and military agencies.246 Learning from
Tasertron’s mistakes, TASER International made the M26 powerful enough such
that targets were guaranteed to be subdued; officers could rely on them.247 In ad-
dition, TASER International employed a sales approach that leaned heavily on the
participation of actual law enforcement officers, who were paid per-session fees to
train other officers to use TASERs.248 As put by Nick Bernardini, the director of a
documentary on TASER International, “These turn into police-conducted sales
pitches . . . . Law enforcement officers had more authority than salespeople with no
police experience. It created a trust factor that its competitors couldn’t match.”249
TASER International quickly dominated the market, to the point that it acquired
Tasertron for a mere $1 million in 2003.250 The company had net sales of roughly
$24.5 million in 2003, when it released the more compact TASER X26.251 The next
year, net sales almost tripled to $68 million, and they nearly tripled again by 2015.252
The number of police departments using TASERs jumped from 125 in 2001 to
roughly 4,300 in 2004.253 More broadly, from 2000 to 2013, the number of law
enforcement agencies using TASERs globally increased from 500 to approximately
241 Taylor, supra note 238; Williams et al., supra note 239, at 32.
242 Taylor, supra note 238; Williams et al., supra note 239, at 32.
243 Taylor, supra note 238.
244 Stroud, supra note 177.
245 Girion, supra note 235; Taylor, supra note 238.
246 Stroud, supra note 177; Taylor, supra note 238.
247 Stroud, supra note 177.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Teresa Riordan, TECHNOLOGY; New Taser Finds Unexpected Home in Hands of
Police, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/17/business/technology
-new-taser-finds-unexpected-home-in-hands-of-police.html [https://perma.cc/2V3R-AKYW].
251 Stroud, supra note 177.
252 Id.
253 Nick Budnick, Is the Portland Police Bureau Going TASER CRAZY?, WILLAMETTE
WEEK (Feb. 3, 2004), http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-2909-is-the-portland-police
-bureau-going-taser-crazy.html [https://perma.cc/VPS2-EM5S].
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17,000 across 107 countries, and TASER International is the sole supplier.254 By
2009, TASERs were used by law enforcement and military entities in 45 countries
and 180,000 units had been sold to private citizens.255
But TASER International’s success and the permeation of CEWs throughout
U.S. law enforcement engendered controversy.256 Beginning with the deployment
of the powerful TASER M26, concerns emerged regarding the safety of CEWs,
specifically with regard to their potential effects on the heart and relationship to
“excited delirium,” a condition “characterized by an acute onset of bizarre and vio-
lent behavior” that is correlated with sudden in-custody deaths of suspects.257 In
2017, Reuters published the results of an in-depth investigation of TASER safety.258
Its findings include the following:
Reuters documented 1,005 incidents in the United States in
which people died after police stunned them with Tasers [sic],
nearly all since the early 2000s . . . . Reuters obtained autopsy
findings for 712 of the 1,005 deaths it documented. In 153 of
those cases, or more than a fifth, the Taser [sic] was cited as a
cause or contributing factor in the death, typically as one of sev-
eral elements triggering the fatality.259
In addition, Amnesty International tabulates 540 deaths following TASER strikes
by police in the United States between 2001 and 2013.260 As far as scientific studies
addressing TASER safety, a litany have been conducted and published, with some
finding connections between CEWs and the negative outcomes noted above (cardiac
problems and excited delirium) and others finding no such connections.261 Some in
254 Stone, supra note 184; Todak et al., supra note 9, at 363. Competitors have attempted
to challenge TASER International’s dominance, but failed. See, e.g., Matt Stroud, Why Taser’s
Only Rival Gave Up Electroshock for Lemonade, VERGE (Jan. 31, 2014, 10:31 AM), https://
www.theverge.com/2014/1/31/5363546/how-taser-defeated-its-last-electroshock-rival [https://
perma.cc/V8HE-CK5C].
255 Woo, supra note 213.
256 MURRAY & RESNICK, supra note 199, at 33; REJALI, supra note 182, at 247–48.
257 HOWARD E. WILLIAMS, TASER ELECTRONIC CONTROL DEVICES AND SUDDEN IN-
CUSTODY DEATH: SEPARATING EVIDENCE FROM CONJECTURE 6 (2008).
258 Shock Tactics, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/section/usa-taser/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2020).
259 Peter Eisler et al., A 911 Plea for Help, a Taser Shot, a Death—and the Mounting Toll
of Stun Guns, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2017, 11:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates
/special-report/usa-taser-911/ [https://perma.cc/JV7R-5ZB2].
260 Annual Report: United States of America 2013, AMNESTY INT’L (last visited Apr. 14,
2020), https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/annual-report-united-states-of-america-2013/ [https://
perma.cc/L5KC-39FP].
261 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 257, at 6 (concluding that excited delirium often asso-
ciated with sudden in-custody deaths); Dawes et al., Conducted Electrical Weapon, supra
2020] TASING THE CONSTITUTION 951
the latter group claim that the oft-compromised states of suspects are to blame (e.g.,
mental conditions, obesity, intoxication), not the weapons.262
TASERs and TASER International also face a number of other controversies.
For example, Reuters reports that the company inserts itself into investigations of uses
of its products, funds studies on its devices’ safety (TASER International–funded
studies are markedly more likely to find no significant safety concerns), and main-
tains its position and defends TASER safety by forging close ties with police,
medical examiners, and consultants.263 Reports also show the weapons used with
disturbing frequency as methods of corporal punishment or torture on individuals
in jails and prisons.264
note 28, at 54 (finding that the X26 did not capture myocardium in human subjects); Colin
Feeney et al., Acute Agitated Delirious State Associated with Taser Exposure, 102 J. NAT’L
MED. ASS’N 1254, 1256 (2010) (determining that Taser exposure “may cause or contribute
to acute or delirious states”); Saul D. Levine et al., Cardiac Monitoring of Human Subjects
Exposed to the TASER, 33 J. EMERGENCY MED. 113, 116 (2007) (finding human subjects
experienced an increased heart rate after TASER exposure, but no other significant cardiac
disturbances); Christian M. Sloane et al., Serum Troponin I Measurement of Subjects
Exposed to the TASER X-26, 35 J. EMERGENCY MED. 29, 31–32 (2008) (determining that
healthy human subjects do not suffer cardiac injury from TASER exposure); Jared Strote et
al., Conducted Electrical Weapon Use by Law Enforcement: An Evaluation of Safety and
Injury, 68 J. TRAUMA INJ., INFECTION, & CRITICAL CARE 1239, 1245 (2010) (finding no
direct cardiac effects from TASER use in laboratory settings); Jared Strote & H. Range
Hutson, Taser Use in Restraint-Related Deaths, 10 PREHOSPITAL EMERGENCY CARE 447,
449 (2006) (concluding that drug use and preexisting disease may factor into sudden
TASER-related deaths); Michael D. White & Justin Ready, Examining Fatal and Nonfatal
Incidents Involving the TASER, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 865, 883–84 (2009) (claiming
drug use and mental or emotional distress are predictors of TASER-related death); Douglas
P. Zipes, Sudden Cardiac Arrest and Death Following Application of Shocks from a TASER
Electronic Control Device, 125 CIRCULATION 2421, 2421 (2012) (concluding that the X26
can cause cardiac electrical capture, particularly in those with a preexisting susceptibility).
262 See, e.g., Dawes et al., Conducted Electrical Weapon, supra note 28, at 53–54; Strote
et al., supra note 261, at 1244; Michael D. White et al., An Incident-Level Profile of TASER
Device Deployments in Arrest-Related Deaths, 16 POLICE Q. 85, 101–02 (2012).
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pons, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-re
port/usa-taser-experts/ [https://perma.cc/CM4Q-NHQW]; see Peyman N. Azadani et al., Funding
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of Device Safety, 162 AM. HEART J. 533, 536 (2011) (finding that studies of TASER safety
funded by TASER International are eighteen times more likely to find no serious issues with
the technology).
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952 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:919
The aforementioned issues aside, a brief history of CEWs reveals a powerful
device that has worked its way “onto the duty belts of officers in about 90 percent
of law enforcement agencies in the United States.”265 This ubiquity means that the
weapons are used relatively frequently against suspects: Axon (formerly TASER
International) estimates that TASERs have been deployed 4,168,242 times (privately
or by law enforcement officers);266 Sarah Kaufman, a reporter for Vocativ, estimates
that TASERs are used by law enforcement officers over 300,000 times per year;267
and a 2012 study reports a TASER International estimate that police officers had
used TASERs roughly 1,520,000 times in the field by the end of 2011.268
Given how widely disseminated and oft-used CEWs are among law enforcement
entities, knowledge of their potential effects on individuals’ capacity to waive their
constitutional rights is important for ensuring the just functioning of the criminal
legal system.
B. How They Work
To properly assess whether CEWs impact cognition and individuals’ capacity to
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their constitutional rights, minimal
appreciations of electricity, its role in human bodily function, and the mechanism
by which CEWs incapacitate targets are necessary. This subsection provides this
information.
1. Electrical Current and the Human Body
Electrical current, both its production and transmission, is integral to the proper
functioning of the human body:
We’re all familiar with the fact that machines are powered by
electricity, but it’s perhaps not so widely appreciated that the
same is true of ourselves. Your ability to read and understand this
[https://perma.cc/D95T-5528]; Tracey Kaplan, Last Time Jail Santa Clara County Guards
Had Tasers? Inmate Was Killed, MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 22, 2017, 7:49 PM), https://www
.mercurynews.com/2017/09/22/equip-jail-guards-with-tasers-old-taser-death-comes-to-life/
[https://perma.cc/5U6J-WHWN]; Mandy Locke, Death by Taser, in a Padded Cell, Caught
on Camera, NEWS & OBSERVER (May 2, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com
/news/local/crime/article75138592.html.
265 Stroud, supra note 177; see Michael R. Smith, TASER Exposure, Miranda Warnings,
and Police Interrogations: New Evidence and Implications, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
75, 75 (2015) (estimating that TASER CEWs are carried by approximately 500,000 state and
local police officers).
266 How Safe Are TASER Weapons?, AXON, https://www.axon.com/how-safe-are-taser
-weapons [https://perma.cc/B6A6-APXY] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
267 Kaufman, supra note 178.
268 White et al., supra note 262, at 86.
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page, to see and hear, to think and speak, to move your arms and
legs—even your sense of self—is due to the electrical events
taking place in the nerve cells in your brain and the muscle cells
in your limbs.269
Electrical current is also the mechanism by which CEWs influence the human body.270
Fundamentally, all matter is made up of minuscule particles called “atoms,” which,
in turn, are made up of smaller particles called “neutrons,” “protons,” and “elec-
trons.”271 Each of these subatomic particles has a corresponding charge: neutrons are
neutrally charged, protons are positively charged, and electrons are negatively
charged.272 Neutrons and protons are much larger and cluster in an atom’s nucleus,
while the smaller electrons orbit the nucleus.273 The entire structure is often pre-
sented as resembling a solar system with planets orbiting a central star. Atoms can
have multiple electron orbits, and each orbit can hold a set number of electrons.274
This number increases as orbits succeed upon one another away from the nucleus,
with the exception that the outermost orbit, the “valence shell,” can only hold a
maximum of eight electrons, or “valence electrons.”275
Atom nuclei, composed of neutrons and protons, are held firmly together by
what is called the “strong force,” but electrons travel more freely between atoms,
particularly valence electrons.276 The ease of movement of these electrons depends
on how many there are along an atom’s valence shell: materials with one, two, or
three valence electrons have relatively weak holds on these particles, easily give
them up, and are called “conductors”; materials with seven or eight valence electrons
hold them more tightly and are called “insulators”; and materials with an amount of
valence electrons between three and seven are referred to as “semiconductors” and
can function as conductors or insulators depending on attendant conditions.277
Conductors are critical to the transmission of electrical force.278 While atoms in
their “natural” state possess equal numbers of protons and electrons and are there-
fore neutrally charged,
269 FRANCES ASHCROFT, THE SPARK OF LIFE: ELECTRICITY IN THE HUMAN BODY 5 (2012);
see IRVING P. HERMAN, PHYSICS OF THE HUMAN BODY 819 (2d ed. 2007) (“It is impossible to
overemphasize the importance of . . . human ‘bioelectricity.’ The function of every cell depends
on it. Every neuron in the brain, every neuron transmitting any information within the body,
every neuron enabling skeletal, cardiac, and smooth muscles is yet another vital example.”).
270 STEPHEN J. RAHM, TRAUMA CASE STUDIES FOR THE PARAMEDIC 77–78 (2005).
271 RESEARCH & EDUC. ASS’N, BASIC ELECTRICITY 12 (2002).
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 STEPHEN L. HERMAN, DELMAR’S STANDARD TEXTBOOK OF ELECTRICITY 38–39 (6th
ed. 2016).
275 Id. at 38–40.
276 RESEARCH & EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 271, at 12.
277 HERMAN, supra note 274, at 40–47.
278 Id. at 41.
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[i]f . . . any number of electrons are removed . . . the whole body
of matter will become electrically positive. Should the positively
charged body come in contact with another body having normal
charge, or having a negative (too many electrons) charge, an
electric current will flow between them. Electrons will leave the
more negative body and enter the positive body. This electron
flow will continue until both bodies have equal charges.279
But the presence of a conductor between unequally charged materials is necessary
for this movement; there must be something connecting the objects through which
electrons can travel.280 Without conductors, there is only “electrostatic force,” which
entails an electrical force between materials where electrons cannot flow: “When two
bodies of matter have unequal charges, and are near one another, an electric force is
exerted between them because of their unequal charges. However, since they are not
in contact, their charges cannot equalize.”281 Yet if they come in contact or a conduc-
tor connects them, “electrical current” (i.e., the flow of electrons) can emerge282:
Electrical energy is transferred through conductors by means of
the movement of free electrons that migrate from atom to atom
inside the conductor. Each electron moves a very short distance
to the neighboring atom where it replaces one or more electrons
by forcing them out of their orbits. The replaced electrons repeat
the process in other nearby atoms.283
For continued effective discourse regarding electricity and its effects, several
measurements and terms are important. A “coulomb” is a measure of charge that
refers to a specific number of electrons: 6.25 x 1018 electrons.284 An “ampere” is a
measure of electron flow rate, and represents a rate of one coulomb per second (e.g.,
one ampere exists in a wire when one coulomb moves past a given point in one
second).285 “Voltage” is the potential difference in charge between two materials and
is the force pushing electrons through a conductor; it is also referred to as “electrical
pressure.”286 Voltage must be present for current to flow; there must be some pressure
279 RESEARCH & EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 271, at 15.
280 See id.
281 Id.
282 HERMAN, supra note 274, at 42.
283 RESEARCH & EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 271, at 13. This is the dominant “Bump Theory”
of electrical current, which “states that current flow is produced when an electron from one
atom knocks electrons of another atom out of orbit.” HERMAN, supra note 274, at 42.
284 HERMAN, supra note 274, at 53.
285 Id. at 53–54.
286 Id. at 59–60.
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pushing the electrons.287 A “volt” is a measure of electrical pressure and is the amount
necessary to cause electrons to flow at a rate of one ampere through one “ohm” of
resistance, an ohm being a unit of resistance to electrical current: one ohm is an
amount of resistance such that one ampere can flow when one volt is applied.288
Norbert Lechner offers a helpful summary of this information:
Electrical pressure results from a difference of electrical charges.
Electrons will flow from a negative charge to a positive charge,
and the greater the difference in charges the greater the electro-
motive force [i.e., voltage] measured in volts (V). The electrical
current [i.e., moving electrons] is propelled by the voltage and
its units are amperes (. . . A). The electrical current is also im-
peded by the electrical resistance . . . measured in ohms ( ).289
Resistance—the ease with which a material gives up its valence electrons and
allows electrical current to pass—is critical to understanding how externally intro-
duced electrical current flows through and affects the human body.290 In order for
current to flow, there must exist a complete path, or complete “circuit,” along which
it can travel.291 If multiple complete circuits are available through which electrical
current can proceed, it will follow the path of least resistance.292 With regard to the
human body, a circuit is most often formed by the two terminals of a device introducing
electrical current to the body or by the current source and the ground, with the body act-
ing as a conductor or “load” between the two points.293 But the body is not a unified
whole in terms of conducting electricity; there are numerous different tissues through
which electrical current can potentially travel, each with distinct levels of resistance294:
In simplistic terms, electricity passes through the body from the en-
trance site to the exit site . . . . Current will course through the body
via multiple parallel paths. The amount is in inverse proportion
287 Id. at 60.
288 Id. at 59–60.
289 NORBERT LECHNER, PLUMBING, ELECTRICITY, ACOUSTICS: SUSTAINABLE DESIGN
METHODS FOR ARCHITECTURE 4–5 (2012).
290 See RAHM, supra note 270, at 77–78 (explaining resistance, electron flow, and assessing
damage on the human body).
291 HERMAN, supra note 274, at 57; see DONNA S. WATSON, PERIOPERATIVE SAFETY 196
(2011) (“The pathway of the electrical current as it flows through the conductor is called the
electrical circuit. There must be a complete circuit . . . .”).
292 Martin Sandberg, AC Power Conditioning, in THE ELECTRONICS HANDBOOK 1024
(Jerry C. Whitaker ed., 1996).
293 Raymond M. Fish & Leslie A. Geddes, Conduction of Electrical Current to and Through
the Human Body: A Review, 9 EPLASTY 407, 411 (2009).
294 RAHM, supra note 270, at 78.
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to the resistance of each path, so the majority of the current
courses through the paths of least resistance. In real life these
paths are not always the physically shortest or the most obvious
paths from the entry to exit site.295
Typically, the first tissue electrical current comes into contact with is skin, the
resistance of which varies depending on extant circumstances: “For example, while
a clean and dry adult human hand has a resistance of approximately 5,000 ohms, a
dirty or wet hand is less resistant (1,000 ohms), and a heavily calloused hand may
have much more resistance (up to 1 million ohms).”296
When placed on a resistance continuum with other tissues, skin is in the middle:
bone, fat, and tendon are more resistant while muscle, blood, and nerves are less
so.297 “Because nerves and blood vessels have low levels of resistance compared to
bones and fat, the current tends to travel along nerves and blood vessels when it
overcomes the resistance of the skin.”298
Depending on its intensity (i.e., voltage, amperage, resistance, etc.), path through
the body, and the length of contact, electrical current can directly damage tissue in two
ways. First, it can cause “electroporation” in cells: “cellular damage in which cell mem-
branes become permeable due to the formation of pores in [their outer membranes].”299
Second, it can cause thermal injury where it meets resistance and generates heat.300
But electrical current can also cause indirect damage by manipulating the
functioning of certain cells, particularly nerve cells (“neurons”) and muscle cells,
which are likely current paths given their relatively low resistance.301 Neurons, for
their part, form the human nervous system: “a complex network within the body
[that] receives, processes, and transmits information from one part of the body to
another.”302 The most substantial portion of this system is the brain, which alone
contains 85 to 120 billion neurons and hundreds of trillions of connections between
295 Brandon C. Bryan et al., Electrical Injury, Part I: Mechanisms, 21 J. NEUROPSYCHI-
ATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 241, 241 (2009).
296 Joseph W. Fink et al., Electrical Injury in the Workplace, in NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT OF WORK-RELATED INJURIES 84 (Shane S. Bush & Grant L. Iverson eds., 2012).
297 Id.; see RAHM, supra note 270, at 78 (“[B]one offers the greatest resistance to electrical
current, whereas blood vessels and nerves offer the least resistance.”); Mark W. Kroll & Dorin
Panescu, Physics of Electrical Injury, in ATLAS OF CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPON WOUNDS
AND FORENSIC ANALYSIS, supra note 217, at 32 tbl.2.4 (providing a chart listing the resistances
of various bodily tissues in ohms).
298 Kevin Duff & Robert J. McCaffrey, Electrical Injury and Lightning Injury: A Review
of Their Mechanisms and Neuropsychological, Psychiatric, and Neurological Sequelae, 11
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY REV. 101, 103 (2001).
299 Fink et al., supra note 296, at 85.
300 Id. at 84–85.
301 See Amanda E. Hahn-Ketter et al., Long-Term Consequences of Electrical Injury: Neuro-
psychological Predictors of Adjustment, 30 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 216, 217 (2016).
302 PAUL DAVIDOVITS, PHYSICS IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 173 (4th ed. 2013).
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neurons, or “synapses.”303 In very general terms, these cells communicate through
a system of chemical interactions that influence their internal charges (i.e., whether
they are positively or negatively charged relative to the surrounding environment).304
In their resting state, neurons are “polarized” in that they maintain an internal charge
different from the surrounding environment; they are negatively charged relative to
their surroundings.305 Neuron cell membranes ensure this by allowing ions (i.e.,
atoms or molecules that have acquired an electric charge by gaining or losing elec-
trons) that are negatively charged to enter the cell but not positive ions, the latter of
which are also actively pumped out.306 However, neurons are equipped with receptor
sites to receive specialized communicative chemicals called “neurotransmitters”
from other neurons.307 The cells do not touch one another, but rather communicate
through the transmission of neurotransmitters across synapses—which entail micro-
scopic gaps between neuron communication points308—and neurotransmitters can
have one of two effects on a neuron: they can either “excite” or “inhibit.”309
Excitation entails a progressive process. To begin with, neurotransmitters bond with
a receiving neuron and induce its cell membrane to open ion channels for the entry of
positive ions into the cell body in the localized area where bonding occurs, slightly
altering the cell’s polarization (i.e., the difference in charge between that part of the
neuron and the outside of the cell).310 When bonding continues such that ion channels
remain open and a threshold charge is reached in the area, a much larger number of
“voltage-gated” ion channels open in the same region (i.e., channels responsive to a cer-
tain difference between a neuron’s internal charge and the charge outside of the cell,
and therefore a certain electrical pressure, or voltage, between these two locations),
allowing for the substantially increased inflow of positive ions.311 And once a specific,
localized positive charge is reached, neighboring regions are stimulated to behave in
the same manner in a cascading fashion down the length of the neuron, with sections
progressively opening to positive ions and becoming positively charged.312 The
303 See RICHARD E. CYTOWIC, THE NEUROLOGICAL SIDE OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 68 (1996);
RONALD T. KELLOGG, FUNDAMENTALS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 14 (2d ed. 2012); Suzana
Herculano-Houzel, The Human Brain in Numbers: A Linearly Scaled-Up Primate Brain, 3
FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 1, 2 (2009).
304 SUNDARARAJAN V. MADIHALLY, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 63 (2010);
see ERIC A. ZILLMER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 103 (2d ed. 2008) (“The
language of human neural communication is chemical.”).
305 ZILLMER ET AL., supra note 304, at 102.
306 Id.; see ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST AND
WORST app. 1, at 683 (2017) (“Remarkably, neurons spend nearly half their energy on the
pumps that generate the resting potential.”).
307 ZILLMER ET AL., supra note 304, at 103–04.
308 GABRIEL A. RADVANSKY, HUMAN MEMORY 32 (3d ed. 2017).
309 ZILLMER ET AL., supra note 304, at 103.
310 SAPOLSKY, supra note 306, app. 1, at 683–84.
311 Id. at 684–85.
312 Id.
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progressive “depolarization” (i.e., the loss of difference in charge between the neuron
and surrounding environment) travels the length of the neuron, ultimately stimulating
the release of neurotransmitters at the end of the cell to communicate with other
neurons, completing a process known as an “action potential.”313
Inhibition, on the other hand, is when a neurotransmitter prompts a receiving
neuron’s cell membrane to take in even more negative ions, thereby further increasing
the cell’s negative charge and “polarization” relative to its surroundings and lessen-
ing the probability that it will fire.314 As a practical matter, excitation and inhibition
occur incredibly rapidly such that “neurons fire more or less continuously, and the
timing and sequences of impulses and pauses determine the message.”315
For their part, muscle cells—often referred to as muscle “fibers”—contract and
relax and are divided into three categories: visceral (or “smooth”), cardiac, and
skeletal.316 Visceral muscles operate involuntarily (i.e., they are not subject to con-
scious control) and form the walls of organs and blood vessels, modulating their
activity.317 Cardiac muscles also operate involuntarily and form the walls of the heart,
contracting regularly to produce the heartbeat.318 Finally, and of most relevance for
the purposes of this Article, skeletal muscles operate voluntarily (i.e., they are subject
to conscious control) and are connected to bone.319 Their contractions pull bones and
allow individuals to produce controlled body movements,320 and they are stimulated
to contract by “motor neurons” that relay commands from the brain.321 Motor neurons’
cell bodies are located in either the spinal cord or the brain, and they communicate
with muscle cells through long branches called axons that have terminals at their
ends that release neurotransmitters when the cells fire, sending the molecules across
synapses to other cells.322 Similar to neurons, muscle cell activity is mediated by
polarization and depolarization.323 That is, when stimulated by certain neurotrans-
mitters (emitted by motor neurons), they take in positive ions that depolarize the cell
and initiate the chemical process of contraction.324
The aforementioned cells’ reliance on manipulations of charge to carry out their
functions illuminates how the introduction of external electrical current might alter
313 Id.
314 STEVEN YANTIS, SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 13 (2014).
315 ZILLMER ET AL., supra note 304, at 103.
316 GARY A. THIBODEAU & KEVIN T. PATTON, STRUCTURE & FUNCTION OF THE BODY 62
(14th ed. 2012).
317 JOSEPH FEHER, QUANTITATIVE HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 240 (2012);
THIBODEAU & PATTON, supra note 316, at 62.
318 THIBODEAU & PATTON, supra note 316, at 62.
319 Id.; M.N. Robinson et al., Electric Shock Devices and Their Effects on the Human
Body, 30 MED., SCI. & L. 285, 297 (1990).
320 See THIBODEAU & PATTON, supra note 316, at 62.
321 Mark W. Kroll, Crafting the Perfect Shock, 44 IEEE SPECTRUM 27, 29 (2007).
322 ASHCROFT, supra note 269, at 104.
323 MICHAEL SHEETZ & HANRY YU, THE CELL AS A MACHINE 180 (2018).
324 FEHER, supra note 317, at 240; SHEETZ & YU, supra note 323, at 180.
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their operation, anywhere from slightly to significantly. This vulnerability in muscle
cells is what CEWs take advantage of to physically incapacitate individuals, and its
manifestation in neurons is a potential mechanism by which a target’s cognitive
abilities might be diminished as well.
2. Incapacitation via Electrical Current
There have been numerous CEW models over the years, and consumers con-
tinue to have their pick of different offerings.325 This subsection, however, will focus
on the TASER X26, which is the most popular CEW among law enforcement.326
Accordingly, “[t]he . . . X26 model is currently the likely device to be used in an
incident . . . due to the hundreds of thousands sold and currently deployed in the
United States . . . .”327 While the specific operating parameters of the X26 differ
from those of other CEWs, the general process employed to incapacitate subjects is
the same, giving the following analysis broad relevance.
The X26 resembles a handheld firearm, but looks more blocky and futuristic.328
It consists of a handle, trigger, and large semi-rectangular cartridge.329 The cartridge
contains, foremost, two barbed, metal darts loaded one on top of the other, each with
approximately .35-inch tips.330 On the opposite ends of each dart are two “whisper-
thin,” insulated copper wires, connected to the darts on one end and to the body of
the X26 on the other.331 When the weapon is fired and the darts shoot out towards
and strike a target, the wires maintain the connection between the darts and the main
device through which electrical current flows.332 The wires are roughly thirty feet
long, giving the X26 an identical range of fire.333 Providing the force to launch the
darts is a canister of compressed nitrogen, which releases a portion of its contents
upon the pressing of the device’s trigger.334 Fired along with the darts are twenty to
325 E.g., Nystrom, supra note 217, at 1–23 (recounting past and present CEW designs and
marketed models).
326 See Jeffrey D. Ho et al., Conducted Electrical Weapon Incapacitation During a Goal-
Directed Task as a Function of Probe Spread, 8 FORENSIC SCI., MED. & PATHOLOGY 358,
359 (2012) (“The X26 is the ‘gold standard’ CEW having been deployed in the field since
2003, and is the device most widely adopted by law enforcement agencies in the U.S.”).
327 R.T. Wyant, Forensics: Conducted Electrical Weapons (Taser), in RISK MANAGEMENT
OF LESS LETHAL OPTIONS: EVALUATION, DEPLOYMENT, AFTERMATH, AND FORENSICS 228
(Rick T. Wyant et al. eds., 2014).
328 See Robin Levinson King, How Do Tasers Work?, STAR (Aug. 27, 2013), https://www
.thestar.com/news/queenspark/2013/08/27/how_do_tasers_work.html [https://perma.cc/H2AJ
-TVN8] (providing a detailed image of a TASER X26 and its component parts).
329 Id.
330 Kroll, supra note 321, at 27–28.
331 Id. at 27, 29.
332 Id. at 28–29.
333 Id. at 29.
334 Id. at 27–28.
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thirty small, colorful, “confetti-like” identification tags adorned with the serial number
of the specific X26 cartridge discharged.335 To aid targeting, a laser sight is located
on the underside of the cartridge.336 And within the device’s handle is a “data port”
that records the date, time, and duration of every trigger pull.337
When the barbed darts lodge in a target, they form a complete circuit, electrical
current flowing from a pulse generator in the X26, through one of the wire-dart pairs
(the positively charged one), through the individual, and back out through the other
wire-dart pair (the negatively charged one) to the device.338 The initial characteristics
of the electrical current vary depending on whether the darts embed in clothing or
tissue. If the former, which happens roughly thirty percent of the time, a relatively
high voltage of 50,000 volts is produced so the current can “arc” across the gap
between a dart and tissue and create a complete circuit.339 The weapon can therefore
transmit electrical current “through two cumulative inches of clothing.”340 However,
individuals are not exposed to such high voltage because it dissipates upon forming
a circuit with the body, doing so by contacting tissue.341
Once a circuit is complete, the parameters of the electrical currents that targets
are subjected to are identical regardless of whether darts embed in clothing or tissue,
but the duration of exposure is dependant on the X26 operator. One squeeze-and-
release of the trigger initiates a five-second current flow—the cycle can be halted
sooner if the device’s safety is engaged mid-operation.342 But this can be extended
if an operator continues pressing the trigger or pulls it additional times while the
circuit is complete.343
335 Police Tasers: Anti-Felon Confetti ID Tags, BERNEWS (Apr. 23, 2010), http://bernews
.com/2010/04/police-tasers-anti-felon-confetti-id-tags/ [https://perma.cc/J2SC-BSZS]; TASER
Cartridges Overview, AXON (last visited Apr. 14, 2020), https://help.axon.com/hc/en-us/arti
cles/235754308-TASER-cartridges-overview [https://perma.cc/9MD4-SJZ3].
336 King, supra note 328.
337 MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 171 (2011); Sandra Upson, The TASER
Gun, an Electroshock Weapon Used by Police Departments Worldwide, Is No Stranger to Bad
Press, 44 IEEE SPECTRUM 26, 26 (2007); King, supra note 328.
338 Kroll, supra note 321, at 28–29.
339 Id. at 29; James D. Sweeney, Transcutaneous Muscle Stimulation, in TASER CONDUCTED
ELECTRICAL WEAPONS: PHYSIOLOGY, PATHOLOGY, AND LAW, supra note 191, at 51; see
WILLIAMS, supra note 257, at 19 (“The purpose of such high voltage is to permit a spark to
cross a gap between clothing and a person’s body should the probes not contact the skin.”).
340 Jeffrey D. Ho et al., Echocardiographic Evaluation of a TASER-X26 Application in the
Ideal Human Cardiac Axis, 15 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 838, 841 (2008).
341 See WILLIAMS, supra note 257, at 19; Kroll, supra note 321, at 29.
342 Larry Greenemeier, TASER Seeks to Zap Safety Concerns, SCI. AM. (Dec. 3, 2007), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/taser-electric-shock-zap-law-canada/ [https://perma.cc
/G9PC-V2RH].
343 See Stuart Casey-Maslen et al., The Review of Weapons Under International Humani-
tarian Law and Human Rights Law, in WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 434 (Stuart Casey-Maslen ed. 2014); Cheryl W. Thompson & Mark Berman, Improper
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It must be noted that rather than maintaining a constant flow of electrical current,
the X26 pulses current through the body at a rate of nineteen pulses per second, each
pulse being approximately 100 microseconds long.344 Thus, while a target’s skeletal
muscles appear to involuntarily contract for the duration of a strike, in reality they
are contracting and relaxing at a rapid pace. This stimulation overrides the motor
nervous system in the affected area and blocks an individual’s command and control
of his body.345 In addition, secondary to inducing muscle contraction, the X26
“elicit[s] strong sensations of pain and/or exhaustion.”346
With regard to the electrical current, the X26 is billed as delivering, on average
over the course of one second, 600 volts and 2.1 milliamperes (i.e., .0021 amperes),347
with a peak voltage of 1,200 volts and peak amperage of 3.3 amperes.348 These
numbers are based on the darts embedding in a target with a resistance of 400 ohms,
that of a human body under the most conductive conditions.349 A study of the char-
acteristics of the X26’s electrical current when applied to volunteers, however, reveals
an average resistance of 602.3 ohms and a range of 470.5 to 691.4 ohms.350 And, on
average, individuals’ resistance decreases by approximately eight percent over the
course of a five-second exposure.351 In turn, the average voltage was 580.1 volts
Techniques, Increased Risks, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/sf/investigative/2015/11/26/improper-techniques-increased-risks/?utm_term=.d60fd82177d5
[https://perma.cc/BG69-7XVN]. The civilian variant of the device produces a ten-second
current flow when fired, which can be extended to thirty seconds if the trigger is pulled two
more times. Michael Martinez, Taser Aims at Home Market as Safety Concerns Mount, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 13, 2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-02-13/news/0502130545_1
_taser-international-stun-firearms/3 [https://perma.cc/MNV5-RC76].
344 Kroll, supra note 321, at 29.
345 Dorin Panescu & Robert A. Stratbucker, Current Flow in the Human Body, in TASER
CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS: PHYSIOLOGY, PATHOLOGY, AND LAW, supra note 191,
at 63.
346 Sweeney, supra note 339, at 51.
347 There is disagreement in the literature with regard to these figures, with the average
voltage being presented as either 400 or 600 volts and the average amperage being presented
as either 1.9 or 2.1 milliamperes. Following a survey of works, the figures that appear most
accepted are presented. See, e.g., James Benjamin Gleason & Ibrahim Ahmad, TASER Elec-
tronic Control Device-Induced Rhabdomyolysis and Renal Failure: A Case Report, 9 J.
CLINICAL & DIAGNOSTIC RES. HD01, HD02 (2015); Jeffrey D. Ho et al., Respiratory Effect
of Prolonged Electrical Weapon Application on Human Volunteers, 14 ACAD. EMERGENCY
MED. 197, 199 (2007); Mark W. Kroll, Physiology and Pathology of TASER Electronic Control
Devices, 16 J. FORENSIC & L. MED. 173, 173–74 (2009); James R. Roberts, The Medical Effects
of TASERs, 30 EMERGENCY MED. NEWS 11, 13 (2008); Greenemeier, supra note 342.
348 Sweeney, supra note 339, at 51–52.
349 See Kroll, supra note 321, at 29.
350 Donald M. Dawes et al., Electrical Characteristics of an Electronic Control Device
Under a Physiologic Load: A Brief Report, 33 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY
330, 335 (2010).
351 Id.
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(ranging from 491.1 to 673.9 volts) and the average amperage per pulse was .97
amperes (ranging from .83 to 1.04 amperes), which scales to an average of roughly 1.9
milliamperes, or .0019 amperes per second.352 The average peak voltage was 1,899.2
volts and the average peak amperage was 3.1 amperes.353
Two numbers from the study are worth briefly expounding upon. First, the
average resistance (602.3 ohms) is meaningfully higher than the 400 ohms generally
used to model X26 performance, indicating that amperage should be lower than
typically predicted, which it is, slightly: 1.9 milliamperes versus 2.1 milliamperes.354
And second, the average peak voltage (1,899.2 volts) is noticeably greater than the
typical model figure (1,200 volts), perhaps explaining why the amperage per second
observed is only slightly below that predicted by the model, despite the resistance
observed being notably higher.355 Yet it has previously been indicated that the X26
actually has an average peak voltage of 1,900 volts, so the study’s findings are not
exceptional in this regard.356
The primary mechanism by which the X26’s electrical current influences a target
(i.e., incapacitates her) is by inducing the involuntary contraction of skeletal mus-
cles.357 And it does this through the “electrical capture” of motor neurons in the vicinity
of the darts.358 That is, the externally introduced current artificially depolarizes the neu-
rons, causing them to fire and prompt the skeletal muscles with which they communi-
cate to contract.359 It is also likely that skeletal muscle cells are directly stimulated to
depolarize and contract, but since they are less excitable than neurons, this would only
occur immediately neighboring the darts where the electrical current is strongest.360
Since the electrical current flows primarily between the X26’s two darts, the
distance between them on a target’s body is important in terms of how extensively
motor neurons are captured, skeletal muscles contract, and the degree of incapacita-
tion suffered. Generally, the farther apart the darts are the greater the distance the
current traverses.361 This means that more skeletal muscles are stimulated and a
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 See id.; Kroll, supra note 321, at 29.
355 See Dawes et al., supra note 350, at 335; Kroll, supra note 321, at 29.
356 See Kroll, supra note 347, at 173.
357 Ho et al., supra note 340, at 840–41; see Panescu & Stratbucker, supra note 345, at 63
(“The CEW method of incapacitation is through electrical activation of skeletal muscle tissue
innervated by peripheral nerves within the electric field created by the CEW.”).
358 Donald M. Dawes et al., The Effect of an Electronic Control Device on Muscle Injury as
Determined by Creatine Kinase Enzyme, 7 FORENSIC SCI., MED. & PATHOLOGY 3, 4 (2011).
359 Kroll, supra note 321, at 29.
360 Sweeney, supra note 339, at 53.
361 See CHARLIE MESLOH ET AL., A QUALITATIVE & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CON-
DUCTED ENERGY DEVICES: TASER X26 VS. STINGER S200, at 9 (2008), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222769.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N5C-5FYA] (“[Dart] spread is im-
portant in a projectile [CEW] to insure electrical current is traveling through a large amount
of muscle mass.”).
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subject experiences more incapacity.362 Accordingly, within the cartridge, the darts
are positioned such that, when fired, they spread apart vertically at an eight-degree
angle, separating approximately one foot for every seven feet traveled.363 They must
lodge in a target at least four inches apart for a complete circuit to form and electrical
current to flow.364 Furthermore, a study shows that the minimum dart spread needed
to effectively prevent a target from advancing forward is at least nine inches, and at
least twelve inches is ideal.365 Current also travels outward from a given dart in di-
rections other than toward the other dart, but to a much more diminished degree.366
This mechanism does not, however, explain how the X26 and other CEWs elicit
muscle contractions in areas well away of those where they appear to directly apply
current, which they are known to do.367 In this vein, it is indicated in an animal study
utilizing anesthetized pigs that the X26 accomplishes the aforementioned feat by
stimulating “spinal reflexes,” particularly when targets are struck on the back of the
torso.368 This is supported by findings that those struck by an X26 on the back of the
torso suffer greater incapacitation than those struck on the front, despite identical dart
spread,369 as well as by the fact that, as noted above, the axons of motor neurons are
highly conductive and lead back to cell bodies located in the spinal cord or brain.370
The potential involvement of spinal reflexes raises an interesting question: If
CEW-introduced current stimulates distant motor neurons by way of the spinal cord,
does it also influence neurons in the brain? As yet, there has been no relevant re-
search on the matter, but it appears to have potentially important implications for the
topic addressed by this Article.
The incapacitation suffered by those exposed to a five-second X26 strike has,
however, been the subject of testing. A 2014 study tested police academy cadets’ ability
to press a button during such a strike and, if unable to do so, how long it took them to
push it after.371 Of the twenty-eight subjects measured, only two pushed the button
while experiencing the current (roughly three and 4.5 seconds into the strike, re-
spectively), and the average time for the rest was approximately 1.2 seconds after the
362 See id. at 29–30.
363 See id. at 53; Robin Washington, Happiness Is a Warm Phaser, MARSHALL PROJECT
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/27/happiness-is-a-warm-phaser
[https://perma.cc/3M9M-P5V8].
364 Greenemeier, supra note 342.
365 Jeffrey Ho et al., Conducted Electrical Weapon Incapacitation During a Goal-Directed
Task as a Function of Probe Spread, 8 FORENSIC SCI., MED. & PATHOLOGY 358, 365 (2012).
366 See Kroll, supra note 321, at 28.
367 See Florin Despa et al., Electromuscular Incapacitation Results from Stimulation of
Spinal Reflexes, 30 BIOELECTROMAGNETICS 411, 418–19 (2009).
368 Id. at 419–20.
369 Ho et al., supra note 365, at 365.
370 See supra notes 316–24 and accompanying text.
371 John C. Criscione & Mark W. Kroll, Incapacitation Recovery Times from a Conductive
Electrical Weapon Exposure, 10 FORENSIC SCI., MED. & PATHOLOGY 203, 203–04 (2014).
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strike ended.372 A control group of seven individuals pushed the button about one
second after an audio stimulus.373 The authors concluded that, “[e]ssentially, upon
cessation of the CEW stimulus, all subjects immediately regained normal control
and coordination required to trigger the button box with response times comparable
to a baseline audio-triggered response.”374 But it is important to note that these
measurements were taken under highly controlled circumstances and from ostensi-
bly healthy, uncompromised individuals.375 In addition, subjects were provided the
task prior to experiencing an expected electrical current, eliminating any cognitive,
information processing aspect from the study.376 Real-world law enforcement situa-
tions are unlikely to be analogous.
In light of the concerns in the previous paragraph, to conclude this subsection
and provide a less technical understanding of the impact of CEWs, the following is
a description offered by law professor David Harris of the experience of being struck
by an X26 in a controlled setting:
I heard a rapid ticking sound, then a loud pop, and I felt the barbs
strike my back with a sting. Faster than I could think, the sting
was replaced with something that felt as if every muscle, from my
legs through my chest and my jaw, had suddenly and painfully
seized up. It was like the most painful cramp I’d ever had, but
giant-sized, body-wide, and with a sharpness that is hard to de-
scribe. My teeth locked together. All the while, a painful pulse
went through me at regular, rapid intervals; it seemed to zap
through me, collecting in my chest. I let out an involuntary, grunt-
ing sound from somewhere deep in my gut. I remember only one
coherent thought in my head while this was occurring: STOP!
STOP! GET THIS OFF ME! Despite my strong desire to do
something, all through the [TASER] exposure I was completely
paralyzed. I could not move at all.
And then, just like that, it stopped. It lasted just five seconds, but
it seemed much longer—the longest five seconds of my life. The
officers held me up; I never lost consciousness, and wasn’t
aware of any feeling that I could not remain standing, but since
most people do become unable to stand, the officers made sure
I didn’t fall. They eased me down to one knee and then to a
372 Id. at 205.
373 Id. at 204.
374 Id. at 206.
375 See id. at 203–04.
376 See id.
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sitting position on the mat, though I insisted that I could stand.
All the while, I felt a little hazy, a bit dazed, and I’d say it took
a few minutes for my head to fully clear.377
C. Effects on Cognition
Research on CEWs has long focused on physiological safety, particularly with
regard to cardiac health.378 It is only recently that studies have examined the potential
influence of the devices on individuals’ cognitive abilities.379 These projects were
initially inspired the finding of cognitive deficiencies in patients exposed to electrical
currents.380 Accordingly, this subsection is divided into two parts. First, the literature
on electrical injuries and their effects on cognition and its relevance to CEWs are
presented. Second, studies investigating the potential connection between CEWs and
declines in cognitive ability and their implications are comprehensively analyzed.
1. Electrical Injuries and Cognition
Electrical injury (EI) is generally defined as “damage to the skin or internal
organs when a person comes into direct contact with an electrical current.”381 This
includes impacts on organ function, which can be manifested by non-physical,
psychological symptoms.382 Since, as noted above, nerve cells are highly conductive
compared to other body tissues,383 “[n]eurons and the brain may . . . be uniquely
377 David A. Harris, TASER Use by Law Enforcement: Report of the Use of Force Working
Group of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 719, 726–27 (2010).
378 See, e.g., Dawes et al., supra note 261; Feeney et al., supra note 261; Eric M. Koscove,
The Taser Weapon: A New Emergency Medicine Problem, 14 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 1205
(1985); Dhanunjaya Lakkireddy et al., Do Electrical Stun Guns (TASER-X26) Affect the
Functional Integrity of Implantable Pacemakers and Defibrillators?, 9 EUROPACE 551 (2007);
Daniel J. O’Brien, Electronic Weaponry: A Question of Safety, 20 ANNALS EMERGENCY
MED. 583 (1991); Robinson et al., supra note 319; Robert Stracbucker et al., Cardiac Safety
of High Voltage TASER X26 Waveform, PROC. 25TH ANNUAL INT’L CONFERENCE IEEE
EMBS 3261 (2003); Zipes, supra note 261.
379 The first such study was conducted in 2008. See Bagley, supra note 20, at 6.
380 Michael D. White et al., Examining the Effects of the TASER on Cognitive Functioning:
Findings from a Pilot Study with Police Recruits, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 267,
268 (2014); Bagley, supra note 20, at 6.
381 Electrical Injury, MEDLINE PLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/000053.htm
[https://perma.cc/MR9P-XBV3] (last updated Mar. 4, 2020).
382 See Duff & McCaffrey, supra note 298, at 101 (“Electrical injury (EI) can be defined
as sequelae due to accidental contact with man-made or generated electrical power.”).
383 See supra notes 297–98 and accompanying text; see also Hahn-Ketter et al., supra note
301, at 217 (“Electricity travels along the path of least resistance, and the central nervous
system (CNS) is particularly susceptible to damage from electric shock due to the low re-
sistance of the nervous system tissue.”).
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vulnerable to [EI].”384 “[I]t is [therefore] not surprising that neurological, psychiat-
ric, and neuropsychological sequelae are abundant in victims of EI.”385
Several studies show that those who have experienced EIs report physical,
cognitive, and emotional symptoms at much higher rates than those who have not,
the latter two symptoms being most relevant to this Article. Cognitive deficits
complained of predominantly relate to memory, concentration, and attention.386 And
emotional complaints frequently concern depression, irritability, and anxiety.387
Subject-reported issues generally match findings from studies involving cogni-
tive testing, brain imaging, and psychiatric evaluation. Those who have experienced
EIs perform markedly worse on memory, learning, concentration, and attention
tests.388 Visual memory appears to be particularly deficient among these individuals,
“especially . . . initial acquisition of new information.”389 Brain imaging research
suggests that “EI is associated with changes in brain function at a network level in
neural substrates involved in cognition.”390
With regard to clinical confirmation of emotional complaints, a study in which
seventy-three EI patients received psychiatric evaluation found that forty-two, or 58%,
warranted psychiatric diagnoses, predominantly of depression, post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), or both.391 In another study in which eighty-six EI patients referred
themselves for psychiatric evaluation, sixty-seven, or 78%, warranted psychiatric
384 Brandon C. Bryan et al., Electrical Injury, Part I: Mechanisms, 21 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY
& CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 240, 241 (2009).
385 Duff & McCaffrey, supra note 298, at 112.
386 See id. at 108; Michael S. Morse, A Report on the Current State and Understanding
of Human Response to Electrical Contacts, in CONFERENCE RECORD OF THE 2013 IEEE IAS
ELECTRICAL SAFETY WORKSHOP 29, 31 tbl.III (2013); Neil H. Pliskin et al., Neuropsychiatric
Aspects of Electrical Injury: A Review of Neuropsychological Research, 720 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 219, 219–21 (1994) [hereinafter Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Aspects]; Neil H.
Pliskin et al., The Neuropsychological Effects of Electrical Injury: New Insights, 888 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 140, 143 (1999) [hereinafter Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Effects].
387 See Duff & McCaffrey, supra note 298, at 108; Morse, supra note 386, at 31 tbl.III;
Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Effects, supra note 386, at 143.
388 See Joseph Barrash et al., Neurobehavioral Sequelae of High Voltage Electrical Injuries:
Comparison with Traumatic Brain Injury, 3 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 75, 80 (1996); Todd
J. Janus & Joseph Barrash, Neurologic and Neurobehavioral Effects of Electric and Lightning
Injuries, 17 J. BURN CARE & REHABILITATION 409, 412–13 (1996); Neil H. Pliskin et al., Neu-
ropsychological Changes Following Electrical Injury, 12 J. INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL
SOC’Y 17, 21 (2006); Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Effects, supra note 386, at 144–45.
389 Duff & McCaffrey, supra note 298, app. C at 114; Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological
Effects, supra note 386, at 145; see Neil H. Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Symptom
Presentation After Electrical Injury, 44 J. TRAUMA: INJURY, INFECTION, & CRITICAL CARE
709, 112 tbl.3, 113 tbl.6 (1998).
390 Alona Ramati et al., Alteration in Functional Brain Systems After Electrical Injury, 26
J. NEUROTRAUMA 1815, 1821 (2009).
391 See Kathleen M. Kelley et al., Life After Electrical Injury: Risk Factors for Psychiatric
Sequelae, 888 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 356, 357 (2006).
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diagnoses, also of depression, PTSD, or both.392 Sufferers of EIs also exhibit mood
and behavioral disturbances, characterized by depression, anxiety, irritability, and
aggressive outbursts.393
There are several additional interesting correlations. First, with regard to both
subject-reported and objectively measured symptoms, “postacute” EI patients (i.e.,
those who experienced EIs more than three months pre-examination) appear to
complain of and suffer more and more severe symptoms and perform worse on
cognitive testing than “acute” patients (i.e., those who experienced EIs less than three
months pre-examination).394 Second, voltage is not shown to correlate with injury
extent.395 Rather, amperage is a more critical metric for predicting degree of harm
suffered.396 Third, EI sufferers experience varying and unique cognitive and emo-
tional symptoms.397 There is no consistent patient profile. Finally, a number of studies
do not include individuals having experienced physical contact between the source
of electrical current and their heads.398 This means that many observed cognitive and
emotional maladies are “diffuse” EIs: injuries or symptoms that manifest at points
remote from the theoretical primary path of the electrical current.399
The last observation is particularly notable. Similar to the manner in which CEW
strikes are postulated to influence bodily areas remote from dart impact locations,400
researchers theorize that electrical current conduction by the spinal cord to the brain
may be responsible for the cognitive and emotional symptoms of EIs when the head
is not a current source’s point of bodily contact.401 This has implications for how
CEWs might potentially influence the brain and cognition with the currents that they
introduce into the body, even when they strike distant locations.
However, a number of limitations with regard to studies examining the link be-
tween EIs and cognitive and emotional impairments limit their relevance to CEWs.402
392 See Alona Ramati et al., Psychiatric Morbidity Following Electrical Injury and Its
Effects on Cognitive Functioning, 31 GENERAL HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRY 360, 364–65 (2009).
393 Barrash et al., supra note 388, at 79–80; Janus & Barrash, supra note 388, at 413.
394 Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Effects, supra note 386, at 143–45, 145 fig.3.
395 Id. at 143.
396 See Duff & McCaffrey, supra note 298, at 102; Jeffrey R. Jones, Electrical Power and
Electrical Injuries, in PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS OF THE WORKPLACE 233 (Gregg
M. Stave & Peter H. Wald eds., 3d ed. 2017); Anastassios C. Koumbourlis, Electrical
Injuries, 30 CRITICAL CARE MED. S424, S425 (2002).
397 See Duff & McCaffrey, supra note 298, at 104; Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological
Aspects, supra note 386, at 221.
398 See Pliskin et al., Neuropsychiatric Effects, supra note 386, at 141; Ramati et al., supra
note 390, at 1821.
399 Morse, supra note 386, at 29; see Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Aspects, supra
note 386, at 219 (“Neurologic sequelae can occur whether or not the head is a point of direct
contact with the electrical current.”).
400 See Morse, supra note 386, at 29–33.
401 Ramati et al., supra note 390, at 1821.
402 See Dawes et al., Conducted Electrical Weapon, supra note 28, at 55 (“[N]ot only is
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Three are particularly noteworthy. First, although amperage is the most useful metric
for predicting EI severity,403 voltage is frequently the only measure provided because
it is easiest to ascertain.404 Second, research generally involves subjects who came in
contact with domestic or commercial power sources,405 which expose individuals to
electrical currents with much higher amperages than those of CEWs.406 And third,
these studies assess individuals days, weeks, months, or years after exposure to elec-
trical current,407 or are retrospective, gathering past data on patients in order to glean
insights.408 With regard to CEWs and Miranda warnings, the concern is cognitive
ability in the immediate aftermath of a strike.
Nevertheless, despite the aforementioned limitations, work at the intersection
of EIs and cognitive and emotional impairment sparked investigations into a potential
link between CEWs and similar symptoms.
2. Conducted Electrical Weapons and Cognition
This subsection comprehensively presents the current state of the art when it
comes to research on the potential impact of CEWs on cognition. In so doing, it
aims to provide the greatest possible aid to practitioners in assessing such possible
influence in general and in specific situations, as well as make a substantial contri-
bution to the literature in this area, which lacks an academic review. Relevant studies
are therefore analyzed in relative depth, including their parameters, strengths, weak-
nesses, and implications.
The first examination of the potential effects of CEWs on cognition is Amy
Bagley’s unpublished, non-peer reviewed 2008 doctoral dissertation in the field of
clinical psychology.409 Inspired by research on the potential link between electrical
the extrapolation of [EI] literature of questionable validity, but the literature which forms the
premise of this extrapolation is of poor quality . . . .”).
403 Duff & McCaffrey, supra note 298, at 102; Koumbourlis, supra note 396, at S425.
404 Duff & McCaffrey, supra note 298, at 102.
405 See, e.g., Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Effects, supra note 386, at 141; Ramati et
al., supra note 390, at 1816; see also Duff & McCaffrey, supra note 298, at 101–02 (“EI[s]
are most common in [the] workplace (e.g., repairing power lines, bumping power lines with
machinery)[,] but can also occur frequently in and around the home (e.g., installing a television
antenna, dropping an electrical appliance in water).”(internal citation omitted)).
406 Jones, supra note 396, at 233; Koumbourlis, supra note 396, at S425; Raphael C. Lee,
Biophysical Injury Mechanisms in Electrical Shock Victims, 12 ENGINEERING MED. &
BIOLOGY SOC’Y 1502, 1502 (1990); Laura Proctor & Srin Kuchibotla, Electricity Remains
a Serious Workplace Hazard, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY (Aug. 1, 2013), https://ohs
online.com/Articles/2013/08/01/Electricity-Remains-a-Serious-Workplace-Hazard.aspx?
Page=1 [https://perma.cc/7W2X-V489].
407 See, e.g., Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Effects, supra note 386, at 141 fig.1, 141–42;
Ramati et al., supra note 390, at 1816.
408 See, e.g., Barrash et al., supra note 388, at 76–77; Janus & Barrash, supra note 388,
at 410–11.
409 Bagley, supra note 20.
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injury and cognitive ability,410 she hypothesizes that “if neuropsychological impair-
ment were to result from [CEW] use, the pattern of deficits would be similar to those
most commonly reported to occur from electrical injur[ies].”411 To test this proposi-
tion, Bagley employs a non-experimental study design. She solicited volunteers
from several Illinois police departments, ending up with sixty-two participants that
she divided into two categories: thirty officers who had experienced CEW strikes
and thirty-two who had not.412 Due to the dearth of CEW deployments in society
generally, police officers, who “are often administered a [CEW] shock before using
this tool in the community,” were singled out.413 Each participant was interviewed
regarding the following topics: the circumstances of their experience(s) with CEWs
(for those having such experience), relevant medical history (individuals with prior
traumatic brain injuries or who suffered falls and head injuries when subjected to a
CEW strike were excluded), and educational history.414 Of those who had previously
been struck, the number of such administrations experienced ranged from one to
nineteen, with a mean of 1.03.415 And the time that had elapsed since the last such
experience ranged from 21 to 2760 days, with a mean of 689 days.416 Bagley classifies
those struck within six months prior to being interviewed as “acute” subjects and those
struck greater than six months before being interviewed as “delayed” subjects.417
After the interview, subjects completed two hours of cognitive testing.418
Overall, participants struck by CEWs performed more poorly than those not,
although the former did not suffer clinical cognitive impairment.419 The cognitive
deficiencies appeared relatively consistent with those experienced by individuals who
have suffered electrical injury.420 Moreover, those subjected to more CEW events per-
formed poorer on memory tests than those subjected to fewer, and individuals struck
by the older TASER M26 model performed worse on attention tests than those ex-
posed to the newer TASER X26 model.421 Bagley therefore tentatively puts forth
that “[t]hese findings may suggest that it is not simply the mechanism of [CEW] shock,
but also the factors surrounding the [CEW] administration (frequency and model type)
that potentially contribute to or exacerbate any potential cognitive manifestations.”422
410 Id. at 2, 16.
411 Id. at 16.
412 Id. at 17.
413 Id.
414 Id. at 17–18.
415 Id. at 27.
416 Id.
417 Id. at 32.
418 Id. at 18.
419 Id. at 33.
420 Id. (first citing Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Aspects, supra note 386; then citing
Pliskin et al., Neuropsychological Effects, supra note 386; and then citing Barrash et al.,
supra note 388).
421 Id. at 34.
422 Id.; see id. at 37 (“These results could suggest that the newer X26 Taser [sic] International
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Additionally, there were no significant differences between the “acute” and “de-
layed” subject populations.423 Participants expressed no subjective appreciation of
any of the aforementioned cognitive effects.424
Bagley’s study, however, suffers a great many limitations, which she details.425
The most significant being that it is not experimental in design, thereby precluding
causal inferences with regard to the relationship between CEW strikes and cognitive
impairment.426 For example, there is no baseline against which to compare the
cognitive test results of participants who experienced CEW events (i.e., there are no
measures of their cognitive performance prior to any CEW administrations).427 But
despite its many weaknesses, Bagley is right to assert the importance of her study:
it is the first to examine the potential influence of CEW strikes on cognition.428
The next presentation is a 2009 case report by Esther Bui et al.429 It addresses
a male police officer in his thirties who took part in a police chase involving a
suspected robber.430 The sequence of events giving rise to the patient’s affliction are
recounted as follows:
[The officer] and a colleague cornered the suspect, who initially
appeared to surrender but then attempted an escape. The officer
had begun to chase the suspect on foot when he experienced a
sudden, severe pain in the back of his head . . . . Police records
indicate that the officer’s colleague had fired a [CEW] shot
meant for the suspect but that the 2 copper darts had instead
model is possibly associated with less deficient cognitive performance relative to non-Tased
participants.”).
423 Id. at 34.
424 Id. at 36.
425 Id. at 36–39.
426 Id. at 38. For a detailed presentation on designing experiments, see generally KLAUS
HINKELMANN & OSCAR KEMPTHORNE, 1 DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS: INTRO-
DUCTION TO EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN (2d ed. 2008).
427 Bagley, supra note 20, at 39.
428 Id. at 2.
429 Esther T. Bui et al., Generalized Tonic-Clonic Seizure After a Taser Shot to the Head,
180 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 625 (2009). There are a number of other case reports presenting
patients who suffered CEW strikes to the head, but they focus on surgical approaches to such
situations and do not contain information regarding any effects on cognition that these injuries
might have generated. See, e.g., Sandy L. Chen et al., Perforating Ocular Injury by Taser,
34 CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL OPHTHALMOLOGY 378 (2006); Paul E. Kaloostian & Huy
Tran, Intracranial Taser Dart Penetration: Literature Review and Surgical Management,
2012 J. SURGICAL CASE REP. 1 (2012); Isabelle Le Blanc-Louvry et al., A Brain Penetration
After Taser Injury: Controversies Regarding Taser Gun Safety, 221 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e7
(2012); Barry E. Mangus et al., Taser and Taser Associated Injuries: A Case Series, 74 AM.
SURGEON 862 (2008); Tausif-Ur Rehman et al., Intracranial Penetration of a TASER Dart,
25 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 733.e3 (2007).
430 Bui et al., supra note 429, at 625.
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struck the officer in the occiput [the back and lower part of the
skull] and upper back.431
The patient remembered feeling intense pain in the back of his head, then he col-
lapsed unconscious.432 His colleague next described the patient as “unresponsive and
foaming at the mouth,” rolling his eyes upward, and experiencing “tonic-clonic
movements” (i.e., muscle stiffening (the tonic phase) and rapid, rhythmic motions (the
clonic phase)) and apnea (i.e., the suspension of breathing) for approximately one
minute.433 The patient was then confused and combative.434 His next memory after
initially falling unconscious was of being in the emergency room, where he steadily
regained orientation over several hours, felt tightness in his chest, and experienced
a severe headache, but physical and neurological examinations returned normal
results.435 After being monitored overnight, he was discharged in stable condition.436
The patient returned to work five days after the incident, but reported experienc-
ing “persistent headaches, dizziness, back pain[,] and chest tightness.”437 A psychiat-
ric evaluation performed seven months after the strike suggested a diagnosis of
adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood.438 The patient had no history
of psychiatric conditions prior to the CEW injury.439 But neuropsychological testing
nine months after the event revealed no evidence of cognitive impairment, and brain
imaging performed twelve months after the incident showed nothing anomalous.440
Finally, patient symptoms of anxiety, difficulties concentrating, irritability, dizzi-
ness, and persistent headaches continued over a year after the strike.441
Though certainly of limited explanatory value given the non-experimental nature
of case reports and their narrow focus,442 it is interesting that the patient in question
exhibited no cognitive impairment when tested.443
Five years later, in 2014, in light of arguments at trial by defendants that CEW
strikes during arrest rendered them incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving











441 Id. at 626.
442 See, e.g., Trygve Nissen & Rolf Wynn, The Clinical Case Report: A Review of Its Merits
and Limitations, 7 BIOMED CENTRAL RES. NOTES 264 (2014).
443 Bui et al., supra note 429, at 625.
444 White et al., supra note 380, at 268–69.
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the relationship between CEWs and cognitive function, Michael White et al. (White
et al. 2014) published a study addressing this topic.445 They solicited twenty-one
police recruit volunteers who were scheduled to be subject to a CEW strike as part
of their training.446 Each completed a series of cognitive tests at three points in time:
(1) between three and four hours prior to CEW exposure; (2) immediately following
(within five minutes of) CEW exposure; and (3) twenty-four hours after exposure.447
As an initial subjective matter, subjects “reported experiencing significantly
more difficulty with concentration and memory immediately following [CEW] expo-
sure” and “feeling more overwhelmed” during their first post–CEW strike test.448 With
regard to test performance, participants “experienced statistically significant reduc-
tions in several measures of cognitive functioning [immediately] following [CEW]
exposure.”449 When tested twenty-four hours post-exposure, scores returned to
baseline, suggesting that cognitive impacts are short-lived.450
White et al. 2014 present their results as having important implications for the
validity of waivers of constitutional rights:
[T]hese findings suggest that [CEWs] may indeed produce deficits
in some dimensions of cognitive functioning. These potential ef-
fects clearly warrant additional empirical study. If these effects
are replicated in additional studies and are severe enough to impair
an individual’s ability to understand and waive Miranda rights,
the implications for police policy and practice could be profound.
Results could influence how and when police read Miranda
rights to suspects who have received a [CEW] exposure.451
Moreover, it is noted that the relatively good health of the study’s participants
“stands in stark contrast to the [often] poor health of individuals who receive [CEW]
exposures in ‘real-life’ encounters with police,”452 the latter of whom are “often
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, are mentally ill and in crisis, and have a
number of serious medical and psychological conditions.”453 Accordingly, CEWs
445 Id.
446 Id. at 272.
447 Id. at 272–74.
448 Id. at 275.
449 Id. at 278.
450 Id.
451 Id.
452 Id. at 279 (citing White & Ready, supra note 261; Michael D. White & Justin Ready,
The Impact of the Taser on Suspect Resistance: Identifying Predictors of Effectiveness, 56
CRIME & DELINQ. 70 (2010)).
453 Id. (citing NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, STUDY OF DEATHS FOLLOWING ELECTRO MUSCU-
LAR DISRUPTION (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/233432.pdf [https://perma.cc
/353K-WEXD]; Michael D. White & Justin Ready, The TASER as a Less-Lethal Force
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could produce greater cognitive deficiency in those whom law enforcement officers
tend to use them against.454
An important limitation of the study mentioned by the authors, however, is the
fact that it is unclear if general cognitive tests are an accurate proxy for the ability
to understand and waive constitutional rights.455 Employment of tests specifically
designed to measure comprehension of Miranda warnings and the rights they are
meant to convey would have meaningfully enhanced the relevance of the findings.
An additional weakness of the study is that it only presents a scenario involving the
use of a CEW. By recounting literature on the cognitive effects of electrical injuries,
White et al. appear to imply that the electrical nature of CEWs could be responsible
for their study results.456 But the cognitive impacts of alternate forceful or stressful
arrest situations (e.g., subduing a suspect by hand, chasing a suspect, administering
pepper spray, etc.) are not presented, so it is unclear if CEWs have a unique effect
or influence individuals in a manner consistent with other arrest methods. The study
also lacks a control condition wherein participants are not subjected to any inter-
vention, allowing the impacts of other conditions to be more reliably assessed.457
Finally, the authors use a convenience sample of police recruits who volunteered for
the study and were going to be subjected to CEW strikes regardless.458 This is not
a representative sample of the population and hinders extrapolation of the results.
The same year, Donald Dawes et al. (Dawes et al. 2014) published their own
study of the cognitive effects of CEWs.459 They additionally endeavored to place
such effects within the context of the cognitive impacts of other simulated forceful
arrest scenarios in order to determine whether CEWs have unique influence.460
The study’s participant population consisted of fifty-seven law enforcement and
correctional officers.461 These individuals completed an initial battery of cognitive
tests and were then subject to one of five scenarios:
(1) a 5 [second] . . . CEW . . . exposure, (2) a sprint of 100 yards
with obstacles, simulating a foot chase, (3) a 45 [second] simulated
Alternative: Findings on Use and Effectiveness in a Large Metropolitan Police Agency, 10
POLICE Q. 170 (2007)).
454 Id.
455 Id. at 280.
456 Id. at 270–72.
457 See Daniel Nelson, What an Experimental Control Is and Why It’s So Important, SCI.
TRENDS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://sciencetrends.com/experimental-control-important/ [https://
perma.cc/48TL-9AJV].
458 White et al., supra note 380, at 272; see Roger D. Yusen & Benjamin Littenberg, Study
Eligibility and Participant Selection, in TRANSLATIONAL AND EXPERIMENTAL CLINICAL
RESEARCH 45–47 (Daniel P. Schuster & William J. Powers eds., 2005) (explaining sampling
methods, including the weaknesses of convenience sampling).
459 Dawes et al., Use-of-Force Scenarios, supra note 28, at 9–10.
460 Id. at 10.
461 Id. at 10, 12.
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fight against a padded instructor, (4) a [canine] search and bite
exercise with a bite suit, and (5) a spray of oleoresin capsicum
(O.C.), or pepper spray, to the face with the eyes shielded . . . .462
Immediately post-scenario, the participants completed the battery again, then two more
times at fifteen minutes post-scenario and one hour post-scenario.463 Three cognitive
tests from the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM) were
used: those measuring visual scanning, processing speed, and learning; attention and
processing speed; and visual spatial discrimination and working memory.464
The following findings were reported: “Over all [sic], we found a decreased cogni-
tive performance . . . immediately following the scenarios that recovered to baseline
within 1 [hour]. There were no statistical differences between the scenarios.”465 More-
over, the decreases from baseline performance were not such as to be deemed
clinically significant.466 Dawes et al. 2014 therefore determined that “the effects [of
CEW strikes] on the cognitive domains tested are transient, of questionable clinical
significance, and similar to the effects of other use-of-force scenarios.”467 The effects
are also contended to “possibly [be] non-specifically related to stress and not to a
specific use-of-force . . . .”468
Nevertheless, cognitive impacts presented, and the authors note that their “data
would seem to suggest that it could be optimal to wait for 15 [minutes] to 1 [hour]
before presenting subjects with more complex neurocognitive tasks[,]” though this
may be a conservative recommendation given the non-clinically significant changes
observed.469 With regard to the study’s implications for the validity of waivers of
constitutional rights following CEW strikes, “it will be debatable whether these
changes will meet the court’s threshold for sufficient magnitude. This will take
additional study and debate.”470 Importantly, the findings suggest that if courts give
special consideration to waivers following CEW administration, they would also
need to give such consideration when other stressful arrest methods are employed
and not subject CEW use to special scrutiny.
462 Id. at 10.
463 Id. at 11.
464 Id.; cf. Robert L. Kane et al., Identifying and Monitoring Cognitive Deficits in Clinical
Populations Using Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM) Tests, 22S
ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY S115, S119 tbl.1, S124 (2007) (“[D]ata are consistent
in suggesting that brief ANAM batteries are both sensitive and specific in identifying patients
with neurocognitive difficulties.”).
465 Dawes et al., Use-of-Force Scenarios, supra note 28, at 14–15.
466 Id. at 15.
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As with White et al. 2014, the findings of Dawes et al. 2014 are limited by the
fact that tests specifically designed to measure Miranda warning and constitutional
rights comprehension were not used. The study also lacks a control condition and
uses a convenience sample.471
Also in 2014, Jeffrey Ho et al. (Ho et al. 2014) tested individuals’ ability to take
and pass standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs) fifteen minutes after the following
conditions: (1) five-second CEW application; (2) one-hundred-yard sprint with
directional changes; (3) forty-five-second simulated combat with an opponent; (4)
police dog attack; and (5) pepper spray to the face.472 SFSTs include three tasks.
First, the “one-leg stand” task tests balance, attention, and cognitive ability by
requiring a subject, with arms at his side, to raise one leg six inches off the ground
and count rapidly from 1,001 to 1,030.473 Second, the “walk and turn” task tests
motor control and attention by requiring a subject to place one foot in front of the
other roughly nine times on a line, make a six-step turn, and repeat the heel-to-toe
steps.474 Finally, the “horizontal gaze nystagmus” test involves an officer presenting
a stimulus to a subject, who must follow it with his eyes while keeping his head still.475
Nystagmus (i.e., the uncontrolled jerking of the eyes) is watched for.476 Ultimately,
all participants passed the SFSTs fifteen minutes post-condition.477 Like Dawes et
al., however, the study lacks a control condition and uses a convenience sample.478
The following year, Michael White et al. 2015 published a study examining
CEWs and cognition.479 The participant population consisted of 142 individuals
from the four Arizona State University campuses.480 Each person was subject to one
of four conditions: (1) control (nothing was done to them); (2) exertion (punching
a heavy bag vigorously for thirty seconds); (3) a five-second CEW strike; and (4)
the CEW strike then exertion.481 Participants completed a battery of cognitive tests
at five points in time: (1) one hour prior to the condition; (2) immediately following
the condition; (3) one hour after the condition; (4) one day after the condition; and
471 Id. at 16–17.
472 Jeffrey Ho et al., Neurocognitive Effect of Simulated Resistance and Use of Force
Encounters on Standardized Field Sobriety Testing, 46 J. EMERGENCY MED. 283, 283 (2014).
473 Gary W. Kunsman, Human Performance Toxicology, in PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC
TOXICOLOGY 20 (Barry Levine ed., 2d ed. 2003).
474 Id. at 19.
475 Id. at 19–20.
476 Id. at 20.
477 Ho et al., supra note 472, at 283.
478 See id.
479 Michael D. White et al., Examining Cognitive Functioning Following TASER Exposure:
A Randomized Controlled Trial, 29 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 600, 600 (2015). The study
is also presented in a different article. See Kane & White, supra note 22.
480 White et al., supra note 479, at 601.
481 Id. at 601–02.
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(5) one week after the condition.482 They also completed a series of “subjective state
questions” at the same five points.483
Participants experienced statistically significant mean score changes with regard
to one of the cognitive tests: the Hopkins Verbal Leaning Test (HVLT).484 The test
[m]easures verbal learning and memory by asking the respon-
dent to recall a set of 12 words in three separate, consecutive
trials. During trial 1, the tester reads aloud the 12 words, and
once completed, asks the respondent to repeat back as many
words as he or she can remember, in any order. The process is
repeated two times; in the delayed recall component, the respon-
dent is asked to recall the words approximately 20 minutes later,
and in a recognition component, the tester reads a separate list
of words and asks the respondent to indicate “yes or no” if he or
she believes each specific word was on the original list.485
With regard to participant scores on the HVLT, the mean participant score declined
by a statistically significant amount from baselines immediately following exertion,
a CEW strike, and the CEW strike-then-exertion combination.486 These effects
dissipated within one hour.487 The difference between the exertion and CEW-then-
exertion groups was statistically significant, while the difference between the exertion
and the CEW and CEW-then-exertion groups were not.488
In a different article presenting the same study, Robert Kane and Michael White
provide more detail on the results.489 They explain that the mean HVLT score for
individuals under seventy-eight years old is 25, and that scores of 18–19 or 19–20
are indicative of mild cognitive impairment.490 The initial mean scores for the par-
ticipants subject to one of the four conditions ranged from 25.75 to 26.68.491 Imme-
diately following the respective interventions, each group had the following mean
scores: 25.46 for control, 23.94 for exertion, 22.89 for the CEW strike, and 22.53 for
the CEW-then-exertion.492 But Kane and White further note that 25.7% of the CEW
group and 28.9% of the CEW-then-exertion group scored below 20, while only
482 Id. at 602.
483 Id.
484 Id. at 606; see Kane & White, supra note 22, at 98.
485 Kane & White, supra note 22, at 88.
486 White et al., supra note 479, at 603–04, 606.
487 Id. at 606.
488 Id. at 604.
489 See Kane & White, supra note 22.
490 Id. at 98 (internal citations omitted).
491 Id. at 93 tbl.2.
492 Id.
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18.8% of the exertion group did (and only 2.7% of the control group).493 In addition,
only 20% of the CEW group and 18.4% of the CEW-then-exertion group scored 26 or
higher, compared to 31.2% of the exertion group and 45.9% of the control group.494
Thus, approximately one-fourth of individuals subject to a CEW strike, according
to the metric adopted by the authors, had HVLT scores indicating mild cognitive
impairment, while only roughly one-fifth of those subject to solely exertion did.495
With regard to participants’ subjective assessments of themselves immediately
following the study conditions, on average, those subject to only a CEW strike re-
ported feeling less able to concentrate, more anxious, and more overwhelmed than
those exposed to exertion only.496 In turn, on average, those subject to the CEW
strike-then-exertion reported feeling less able to concentrate, more anxious, and
more overwhelmed than those who experienced a CEW strike alone.497 These dif-
ferences, however, are not consistently statistically significant.498
Kane and White assert that the study’s results depart from those of Dawes et al.
2014 because of the statistically significant difference in cognitive performance
between the exertion and CEW-then-exertion groups, whereas Dawes et al. 2014
presented no statistically significant difference between any of their conditions.499
Kane and White believe this shows a unique CEW effect on cognition and, as a
result, that the study has significant implications for the administration of Miranda
warnings and assessments of the validity of constitutional rights waivers.500 Citing
research indicating that those with mild cognitive impairment are more likely to
waive their constitutional rights and provide inaccurate information to law enforcement
than those without, the authors speculate that individuals subject to CEW strikes might
behave in a similar fashion immediately following these events.501 Their concerns are
heightened by the fact that the study participants were relatively healthy, well-educated
young adults, as opposed to what they term “typical” criminal suspects “who may
be drunk, high, or mentally ill and in crisis at the time of [CEW] exposure” and
might therefore experience even greater cognitive declines.502
493 Id. at 98–99 (internal citations omitted).
494 Id. at 99.
495 Id. at 98–99.
496 Id. at 96 tbl.3.
497 Id.
498 Id. at 95–98.
499 Id. at 102.
500 See id. at 99–100 (internal citations omitted).
501 Id. at 99 (citing Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, Risk Factors, and
Recommendations: Looking Ahead, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 49 (2010); Michael J. O’Connell
et al., Miranda Comprehension in Adults with Mental Retardation and the Effects of Feed-
back Style on Suggestibility, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 359 (2005); Richard Rogers et al., An
Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehension and Coverage, 31 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 177 (2007)).
502 Id. at 100.
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To address the aforementioned potential risks, Kane and White make the follow-
ing recommendation: law enforcement officers should wait sixty minutes following
a successful CEW deployment before administering Miranda warnings to suspects and
seeking to obtain waivers of constitutional rights.503 They contend that this would
be beneficial for both suspects and law enforcement by having the following effects:
(a) preserve Miranda’s intent to reduce the overwhelming ad-
vantage police officers enjoy over most suspects during custodial
interrogations and (b) reduce the probability that suspect state-
ments and confessions would be excluded from evidence during
suppression hearings by judges who agree with defense counsel
claims that their clients could not give valid waivers as the result
of [CEW] exposure.504
The limitations of the study giving rise to these recommendations are, however,
numerous and significant. First, Kane and White’s highlighting of individual HVLT
scores by noting the percentages of participants who scored below the marker for
mild cognitive impairment after administration of the conditions is troubling.505 The
data reveal no statistically significant differences between the exertion and CEW
groups, but the authors attempt to illuminate a meaningful difference by presenting
information on individual responses, despite White et al. 2015 acknowledging that
“[t]he nature and severity of cognitive deficits following [CEW] exposure were
highly individualized.”506 It is well known that individual physiological and psycho-
logical stress reactivity, as a general matter, are variable.507 Moreover, Kane and
White do not present the individual baseline HVLT scores or the degree to which
any individuals scored below the authors’ marker for mild cognitive impairment
after intervention, providing no context for post-condition scores. If twenty-five
percent of participants who were subject to a CEW strike barely scored above the
authors’ marker for mild cognitive impairment pre-condition, and barely scored below
the marker post-condition, then CEW cognitive effects are marginal and likely of
little relevance to courts determining the validity of waivers of constitutional rights.
The information on individual responses therefore has no value with regard to the
503 Id. at 101.
504 Id.
505 Id. at 98–99.
506 White et al., supra note 479, at 606.
507 See, e.g., Adam Bibbey et al., Personality and Physiological Reactions to Acute Psycho-
logical Stress, 90 INT’L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 28, 28 (2013); Emma Childs et al., Personality
Traits Modulate Emotional and Physiological Responses to Stress, 25 BEHAV. PHARMACOLOGY
493, 493 (2014); André B. Negrão et al., Individual Reactivity and Physiology of the Stress
Response, 54 BIOMEDICINE & PHARMACOTHERAPY 122, 122 (2000); Anita Singh et al.,
Differential Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis Reactivity to Psychological and Physical
Stress, 84 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 1944, 1944 (1999).
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relationship between CEWs and cognitive ability and muddies the study’s results
and scientific contribution.
Second, the conditions administered in the study do not appear as comparable
as those administered by Dawes et al. 2014.508 The exertion condition did not in-
volve the imposition of stress upon participants by another actor or the application
of physical discomfort or pain, simply the punching of a heavy bag.509 CEW strikes
entail these potentially stress-enhancing and cognitive ability-diminishing aspects.
Dawes et al. 2014, on the other hand, included conditions involving a simulated
physical fight with an opponent, a police dog bite on an individual wearing a bite
suit, and the administration of pepper spray, which more closely resemble the
confrontation and physical discomfort or pain of a CEW strike.510
Third, Kane and White’s claim that the study results are “contradictory” to those
of Dawes et al. 2014 appears false.511 Kane and White assert that because the CEW-
then-exertion group had a statistically significantly lower mean HVLT score than
the exertion group post-intervention, the data support CEWs having a unique effect
on cognition beyond that of other stressors.512 Yet there is no statistically significant
difference in mean scores between the exertion and CEW groups,513 suggesting,
rather, that there is an additive effect on cognition when two stressors are experi-
enced as opposed to one, not a unique, elevated CEW effect.
Fourth, similar to White et al. 2014,514 by invoking the literature on electrical
injuries, White et al. 2015 and Kane and White allude to the electrical nature of CEWs
being responsible for any subsequent cognitive impairment in individuals who suffer
a CEW strike.515 This, however, is not supported by the data since the difference
between the mean cognitive declines experienced by the exertion and CEW groups
is not statistically significant, suggesting that an analogous stress response is re-
sponsible in both instances.516
Finally, like previous studies, White et al. 2015 do not utilize tests specifically
designed to gauge Miranda warning comprehension, but instead use general cogni-
tive tests,517 limiting the relevance of their results. They also study a convenience
sample of college students that is not representative of the population.518
508 See White at al., supra note 479, at 601.
509 Id.
510 Dawes et al., Use-of-Force Scenarios, supra note 28, at 10.
511 Kane & White, supra note 22, at 102.
512 Id.
513 White et al., supra note 479, at 604.
514 White et al., supra note 380, at 270–72.
515 See Kane & White, supra note 22, at 82–83; White et al., supra note 479, at 600, 606
(internal citations omitted).
516 Kane & White, supra note 22, at 102.
517 White et al., supra note 479, at 601.
518 Id. Problems with using college student convenience samples are well documented.
See, e.g., Paul H. P. Hanel & Katia C. Vione, Do Student Samples Provide an Accurate Estimate
of the General Public?, PLOS ONE, Dec. 21, 2016, at 1; Robert A. Peterson & Dwight R.
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In addition to the aforementioned internal issues and problematic interpretations,
others have seized on the study’s results and further distorted them. Notably, Henry
Fradella titles his article, Neuroscience and the Potential Need for a New Bright-
Line Rule Concerning Miranda Waivers After CED Exposure,519 the first word
portending trouble. Based on White et al. 2015’s findings, Fradella supports Kane
and White’s recommendation for a sixty-minute waiting period between CEW
strikes and administrations of Miranda warnings.520 But he couches his support in
the following terms: “Kane and White suggest that although use of force produces
a stress response that impairs cognitive functioning, [CEW] exposure seems to
compound that decline . . . significantly as a result of electricity scrambling brain
signals . . . .”521 He goes on to argue that “it would be fundamentally unfair to
scramble the electrical signals in the brain, thereby significantly impairing cogni-
tion, and then claim that what is said during the period of impairment was voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent.”522 But White et al. 2015’s study does not involve neuro-
science, nor is there any indication that CEWs are directly impacting the brain by
way of electrical current. In fact, White et al. 2015 specifically note that their study
sheds no light on the mechanisms by which CEWs induce cognitive deficits and that
neuroscience research in this regard could be helpful.523
Ultimately, White et al. 2015’s results are interesting and meaningfully add to
the literature on CEWs and cognitive impairment. Unfortunately, however, Kane
and White’s presentation of these results is misleading and shows them apparently
bending over backwards to argue that the data support CEWs diminishing cognitive
function in an extraordinary fashion (not to mention Fradella’s dubious understand-
ing of White et al. 2015’s findings).524
The final study to examine the potential cognitive impacts of CEW strikes was
published in 2018 by Donald Dawes et al. (Dawes et al. 2018).525 The participant
population consisted of 115 individuals taking part in a CEW training exercise, a
large number of whom were law enforcement, correctional, or security officers.526
They were divided into five groups depending on the condition they were to experi-
ence: (1) a five-second CEW exposure; (2) a high intensity interval training routine
(HIIT); (3) “low” alcohol intoxication (LAI); (4) “high” alcohol intoxication (HAI);
and (5) control.527 With regard to the HIIT, this
Merunka, Convenience Samples of College Students and Research Reproducibility, 67 J.
BUS. RES. 1035 (2014).
519 Fradella, supra note 27, at 117.
520 Id. at 126.
521 Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
522 Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
523 White et al., supra note 479, at 606.
524 See Kane & White, supra note 22, at 98, 102.
525 Dawes et al., Conducted Electrical Weapon, supra note 28.
526 Id. at 52–53.
527 Id. at 52.
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consisted of 10 steps/jumps onto an 8-inch (20 cm) plyometric
box, followed by 10 ground-to-overhead lifts of 15-pound (7 kg)
dumb bells, followed by 10 strikes on a large tractor tire with an
8-pound (3.6 kg) sledge hammer with the stations repeated in
order until . . . 90 [seconds] elapsed.528
In turn, LAI is marked by a blood alcohol content (BAC) below or equal to 0.12
grams/210 liters, as estimated from a portable breath-alcohol test (the mean BAC for
this group was 0.08 g/210 L, the legal limit for an adult of drinking age to operate
a motor vehicle in the United States), and HAI delineates a BAC above 0.12 g/210
L (the mean BAC for this group was 0.16 g/210 L).529 Participants completed a
battery of cognitive tests at five points in time: (1) pre-condition; (2) ten minutes
post-condition; (3) thirty-five minutes post-condition; (4) sixty minutes post-condition;
and (5) eighty-five minutes post-condition.530 Similar to Dawes et al. 2014’s study,
three cognitive tests from the ANAM were used, though with one substitution: those
measuring attention and processing speed; visual spatial discrimination and working
memory; and abstract reasoning and verbal syntax.531
The results indicated that, ten minutes post-condition, while all groups except
the control group experienced mean score declines, only the LAI and HAI groups
experienced statistically significant declines in cognitive performance across all
three tests.532 All mean scores for the CEW and HIIT groups returned to baseline
within thirty-five minutes post-condition, and those of the LAI group did so within
eighty-five minutes post-condition.533 The mean scores of the HAI group did not
return to baseline within the eighty-five-minute testing period.534
After presenting their findings, given the lack of empirical support for CEWs
having a unique impact on cognitive ability, Dawes et al. 2018 note the oddity of
Kane and White recommending a bright-line rule for the delayed administration of
Miranda warnings following CEW strikes on suspects.535 Rather, they offer the
following summation of the relevant literature:
[T]he CEW neurocognitive literature suggests many stressors
can transiently cause neurocognitive changes that can be mea-
sured in a neurocognitive battery, but these changes may not be
528 Id.
529 Id. at 53. For an explanation of BAC estimation based on breath-alcohol measurement,
see RACHEL BLACK, ALCOHOL IN POPULAR CULTURE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 39 (2010).
530 Dawes et al., Conducted Electrical Weapon, supra note 28, at 53.
531 Id.; see supra note 464 and accompanying text.
532 Dawes et al., Conducted Electrical Weapon, supra note 28, at 54–55.
533 Id. at 55.
534 Id.
535 Id.
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of a magnitude to be deemed “clinically” important or legally
relevant to the issue of Miranda or consent. The results of our
present study would suggest that the transient neurocognitive
changes after a CEW exposure are not legally relevant with
regard to Miranda and consent. All of the literature shows that,
although there are measurable neurocognitive changes, these
changes are transient with no long-term effects.536
The study does, however, suffer many of the same limitations as previous ones: it
utilizes tests designed to measure cognition generally, not Miranda warning compre-
hension specifically, and a convenience sample.537
Study weaknesses aside, the supposition that CEWs influence cognition as
stressors by inducing general stress responses, rather than producing exceptional
cognitive declines by way of unique electrical influence, is further supported by
research examining physiological responses to CEW strikes. These are presented
here in slightly less detail.
In 2009, John Criscione produced a non-peer reviewed report consisting of a
study of the physiological effects of CEWs, sponsored by the Department of De-
fense’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate.538 The participants were thirty-two
police cadets exposed to CEWs as part of their training.539 Pertinently, blood samples
were taken from them at three points in time: (1) immediately pre-condition; (2)
immediately post-condition (it is unclear exactly how soon after the CEW adminis-
tration); and (3) twenty-four hours post-condition.540 The mean levels of several
molecules were analyzed,541 but only cortisol and lactic acid increased above baseline
levels immediately post-condition, and only the latter by a statistically significant
amount.542 The upsurge in lactic acid—a waste product of muscle tissue during
strenuous exercise—reflects the extensive muscle contractions induced by CEWs.543
In turn, increased cortisol concentration in blood is a typical response to stressful
stimulation, indicating that a CEW strike is a stressful event.544
536 Id. at 56.
537 See White et al., supra note 479, at 601.
538 JOHN CRISCIONE, AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE PHYSIOLOGICAL AND COG-
NITIVE EFFECTS FROM THE X-26 TASER DEVICE IN VOLUNTEER HUMAN SUBJECTS (2009),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f03a/e8b48686aacaee397d2269bc1ecf1af889b8.pdf?_ga=2.
45535271.205894286.1584482559-1654866579.1584482559 [https://perma.cc/37JB-ZT6V].
539 Id. at 6.
540 Id. at 5–6.
541 Id. at 6 (“Levels of particular relevance to this investigation include C-reactive protein
(cardiac), cardiac troponin I, creatine kinase, serotonin, serum potassium, serum myoglobin,
lactic acid and cortisol.”).
542 Id. at 6–7.
543 Id. at 9; see BRUCE ABERNETHY ET AL., THE BIOPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN
MOVEMENT 128 (2d ed. 2005) (“Excess lactic acid is associated with muscular fatigue.”).
544 CRISCIONE, supra note 538, at 9; see CHERYL WATSON, HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY 54
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The same year, Donald Dawes et al. (Dawes et al. 2009) published a more
comprehensive study examining CEW strikes and physiological stress markers.545
The fifty-two participants were culled from those taking part in a law enforcement
training course and subjected to one of four conditions: (1) a five-second CEW
exposure; (2) a five-second spray of oleoresin capsicum (the raw material from
which pepper spray is made) to the eyes; (3) a forty-five-second placement of the
hand and forearm in zero degree Celsius water; or (4) a one-minute defensive tactics
drill (i.e., “[one] [minute] of the subject preventing multiple defensive tactics in-
structors from trying to remove a simulated handgun from his holster on his duty belt
while in the supine position on a training mat”).546 Salivary samples were procured
from participants ten to fifteen minutes pre-condition, ten to twenty minutes post-
condition, and forty to sixty minutes post-condition.547 The mean levels of two mole-
cules indicative of the physiological stress response were analyzed: alpha-amylase
and cortisol.548 With regard to the first post-condition measurement (ten to twenty
minutes post-condition), mean alpha-amylase levels increased in the oleoresin capsi-
cum and defensive tactics participants, most dramatically in the latter.549 These levels
remained roughly constant in the CEW condition and decreased in the cold-water
condition.550 By forty to sixty minutes post-condition, they had decreased in the CEW
and defensive tactics conditions, most significantly in the latter.551 The mean level
increased slightly at this point in the oleoresin capsicum and cold-water condition
participants.552 Turning to mean cortisol levels, these increased in all participants,
but most significantly in those subject to oleoresin capsicum, followed by those ex-
posed to CEWs.553 Cold-water participants displayed only a slight increase.554 By the
second measurement, levels continued increasing in all participants, with the defensive
tactics cohort experiencing the largest increase, followed by the CEW group.555 The
oleoresin capsicum and cold-water groups experienced only modest increases.556
(2015) (“Physiological stresses, such as cold, severe exercise, and injury, or psychological
stresses like fear or anxiety can increase the release of . . . cortisol.”).
545 Donald Dawes et al., The Neuroendocrine Effects of the TASER X26: A Brief Report,
183 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 14 (2009).
546 Id. at 15.
547 Id.
548 Id.; see WATSON, supra note 544, at 54 (noting cortisol’s relationship to stress); Urs
Markus Nater et al., Stress-Induced Changes in Human Salivary Alpha-Amylase Activity—
Associations with Adrenergic Activity, 31 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 49, 55 (2006) (finding
a “clear and distinct pattern of stress-related changes in salivary alpha-amylase”).
549 Dawes et al., supra note 545, at 17 figs.1–2, 18.
550 Id.
551 Id. at 17 fig.1.
552 Id.
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Dawes et al. 2009 proffer that the results “suggest that exertion and [oleoresin
capsicum] may have the most important influence on these markers of stress when
compared to the cold-water immersion tank or the . . . CEW.”557
A study published one year later, by Jeffrey Ho et al. (Ho et al. 2010) presents
similar results.558 Participants were taken from those taking part in a training event
sponsored by TASER International and consisted of sixty-two law enforcement and
corrections officers, non-law enforcement public safety personnel, TASER Interna-
tional employees, and academic researchers.559 Each was subjected to one of five
conditions: (1) a 150-meter sprint and wall hurdle; (2) forty-five seconds of punch-
ing and kicking a heavy bag; (3) a ten-second CEW exposure; (4) a simulated attack
by a law enforcement canine; or (5) the application of oleoresin capsicum foam to
the face and neck.560 Participants had blood taken pre-condition, immediately (within
thirty seconds) post-condition, every two minutes after the first post-condition draw
until ten minutes passed, and twenty-four hours post-condition.561 Several indicators
of stress were examined.562 Mean blood concentrations of substances (lactate and
potassium)563 and markers (blood acidity)564 associated with exercise increased or
decreased appropriately in accordance with the physical strenuousness of the condition,
with the sprint and heavy bag conditions exhibiting the greatest changes.565 In addition,
immediately post-condition, mean levels of each catecholamine (epinephrine, norepine-
phrine, and dopamine; hormones associated with the body’s stress response)566
increased, most dramatically in the heavy bag group.567 Mean levels for those subject
to a CEW strike were the second-highest with regard to epinephrine and norepine-
phrine, and roughly equal to the heavy bag group with regard to dopamine.568 These
557 Id. at 18.
558 Jeffrey D. Ho et al., Acidosis and Catecholamine Evaluation Following Simulated Law
Enforcement “Use of Force” Encounters, 17 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. E60 (2010).
559 Id. at E61–E62.
560 Id. at E61.
561 Id. at E62.
562 Id. at E63–E65 tbls.2–5, fig.1.
563 See Mark Hargreaves, Skeletal Muscle Carbohydrate Metabolism During Exercise, in
EXERCISE METABOLISM 41 (Mark Hargreaves & Lawrence Spriet eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“Blood
lactate exponentially increases with exercise of increasing intensity . . . .”); Michael I. Lindinger,
Potassium Regulation During Exercise and Recovery in Humans: Implications for Skeletal
and Cardiac Muscle, 27 J. MOLECULAR & CELLULAR CARDIOLOGY 1011, 1011–13 (1995).
564 See JOHN CLANCY & ANDREW MCVICAR, PHYSIOLOGY AND ANATOMY FOR NURSES
AND HEALTHCARE PRACTITIONERS: A HOMEOSTATIC APPROACH 130 (3d ed. 2009) (noting
that blood acidity increases as a result of the body’s response to stress).
565 Ho et al., supra note 558, at E63–E64 tbls. 3–4.
566 See GEORGE S. EVERLY, JR. & JEFFREY M. LATING, A CLINICAL GUIDE TO THE TREAT-
MENT OF THE HUMAN STRESS RESPONSE 33–34 (2d ed. 2002) (detailing the role of catecho-
lamines in the human physiological stress response).
567 Ho et al., supra note 558, at E65 fig.1.
568 Id.
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levels then lowered considerably by the second measuring point (two minutes after
the first), and continued declining until measurement ceased.569 The authors tenta-
tively conclude that “[t]he [CEW] device, [canine], and [oleoresin capsicum] groups
show that [law enforcement] intervention with these tactics and tools may have less
negative consequences for acidosis and catecholamine levels than physical resis-
tance or allowing the subject to flee . . . .”570
It must be noted that funding for the studies by Dawes et al. 2009, Ho et al.
2010, Dawes et al. 2014, Ho et al. 2014, and Dawes et al. 2018 was provided by
TASER International, the leading producer of CEWs, and several of the authors
received compensation from the company.571 A review of studies investigating the
physiological safety of CEWs concluded that “studies funded by TASER Interna-
tional or written by authors affiliated with the company are nearly 18 times more
likely to conclude that [CEWs] are safe.”572 Nevertheless, it is telling that the study
with no affiliations with TASER International—that by White et al. 2015—produced
results analogous to those with links to the corporation.573 Moreover, the findings of
the CEW-specific research are consistent with those of the robust literature examining
the impact of physiological and psychological stress on cognitive ability. These
studies, including those applying electrical stimulation, show that stress disrupts
cognition.574 They also show a positive link between stressors and levels of certain
hormones in the body (e.g., cortisol and catecholamines), and a negative link be-
tween elevated levels of such hormones and cognitive ability.575
569 Id.
570 Id. at E67.
571 See Azadani et al., supra note 263, at 533–36, 536 nn.6 & 13–16 & 19 & 22, 537 nn.33
& 38 & 45 & 49–51 & 58.
572 Id. at 536; see Jared Strote, Lay Person Use of Conducted Electrical Weapon Research,
238 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e20 (2014) (cautioning against lay person reliance on studies
conducted in controlled settings to assess the effects of CEW administrations during real life
arrests, particularly studies funded by TASER International, Inc.).
573 See White et al., supra note 479, at 29.
574 See generally, e.g., Arnoud Arntz & Miranda Hopmans, Underpredicted Pain Disrupts
More than Correctly Predicted Pain, but Does Not Hurt More, 36 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY
1121 (1998); Roman Duncko et al., Working Memory Performance After Acute Exposure to
the Cold Pressor Stress in Healthy Volunteers, 91 NEUROBIOLOGY LEARNING & MEMORY
377 (2009); Chris Eccleston & Geert Crombez, Pain Demands Attention: A Cognitive-
Affective Model of the Interruptive Function of Pain, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 356 (1999); Peter
A. Hancock et al., A Meta-Analysis of Performance Response Under Thermal Stressors, 49
HUM. FACTORS 851 (2007); Vicki R. LeBlanc, The Effects of Acute Stress on Performance:
Implications for Health Professions Education, 84 ACAD. MED. S25 (2009); James S. Olver
et al., Impairments of Spatial Working Memory and Attention Following Acute Psychosocial
Stress, 31 STRESS & HEALTH 115 (2015).
575 See generally, e.g., Amy F.T. Arnsten, The Biology of Being Frazzled, 280 SCI. MAG.
1711 (1998); Bernet M. Elzinga & Karin Roelofs, Cortisol-Induced Impairments of Working
Memory Require Acute Sympathetic Activation, 119 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 98 (2005);
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The CEW-focused research and its accordance with the broader literature on
stress and cognition strongly support CEW exposure influencing cognition by way
of the human stress response, not by directly altering brain function with electrical
current. But regardless of the method of influence, CEWs also do not appear to have
a uniquely significant effect on cognitive ability relative to other comparable stres-
sors, such as physical exertion (e.g., simulated combat and sprinting) and the
application of pepper spray.576
Going forward, in order to produce results of more value to legal practitioners
in assessing in-custody waivers, researchers should heed the following non-exhaustive
list of recommendations: utilize tests designed to specifically measure Miranda
warning comprehension; conduct testing at more frequent intervals and closer in
time to the conditions to better approximate the length of cognitive effect; employ
conditions that better approximate forceful arrest interactions, such as those involv-
ing more physical confrontation between subjects and other actors; compare the
impact on cognition and Miranda warning comprehension when the CEW darts are
still embedded in a subject with when they are not; and utilize more conditions that
expose subjects to more than one stressor to assess their potential additive effects
on mental abilities.
D. Legal Implications
With regard to Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and Miranda warnings, given
CEWs’ apparently non-specific, likely stress-mediated effect on cognition, a CEW-
specific delay period between CEW strikes and the administration of Miranda warn-
ings, as recommended by several authors, does not appear warranted.577 Rather, the
occurrence of a CEW administration during arrest and its proximity to a Miranda
warning and waiver of one’s constitutional rights are likely simply further variables
for consideration by a judge determining the waiver’s validity.
It must, however, be cautioned that the cognitive effects of CEW strikes re-
vealed by studies are those elicited under highly controlled conditions with ostensi-
bly mentally and physically healthy subjects. It is likely that the often chaotic and
violent circumstances of actual arrests in which CEWs or other forceful means are
Sonia J. Lupien et al., The Effects of Stress and Stress Hormones on Human Cognition:
Implications for the Field of Brain and Cognition, 65 BRAIN & COGNITION 209 (2007); Bruce
S. McEwen & Robert M. Sapolsky, Stress and Cognitive Function, 5 CURRENT OPINION
NEUROBIOLOGY 205 (1995); Terry McMorris et al., Heat Stress, Plasma Concentrations of
Adrenaline, Norepinephrine, 5-Hydroxytryptamine and Cortisol, Mood State and Cognitive
Performance, 61 INT’L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 204 (2006); Carmen Sandi & M. Teresa
Pinelo-Nava, Stress and Memory: Behavioral Effects and Neurobiological Mechanisms,
2007 NEURAL PLASTICITY 1.
576 See Dawes et al., Use-of-Force Scenarios, supra note 28, at 17.
577 Fradella, supra note 27, at 124–25; Kane & White, supra note 22, at 101.
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deployed, which frequently involve psychologically and physically compromised
individuals, will produce more severe cognitive deficits in targets.578
But the aforementioned body of work has broader legal implications than that
noted above. By focusing on the mental effects of CEWs relative to other simulated
arrest situations, these studies illuminate and begin to fill a hole in court opinions
and the literature on Miranda warning comprehension: research-informed examina-
tion of the cognitive impacts of forceful arrest methods.
III. FILLING A VOID IN COURT OPINIONS AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Courts “ha[ve] long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory
stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or
threat thereof to effect it.”579 Nevertheless, they also generally accept that “the force
used to subdue a person may contribute to his inability to understand Miranda warnings
and to the involuntariness of any statements he subsequently makes.”580 (In a similar
vein, other stressful events prior to arrests and waivers are considered for their po-
tential to negatively augment an individual’s knowledge, intelligence, and volition.)581
But the manner by which courts assess the impact of forceful arrests on defendant
cognition and competence to waive constitutional rights is largely observational and
visceral, and would benefit from the assembly of an objective foundation.
For the most part, courts rely on their own observations (of recordings or trans-
cripts) or those of witnesses to deduce the impact of forceful arrests on defendant
mental competence for the purpose of assessing in-custody waivers of constitutional
rights.582 They key in on several details, including: the intensity of the event, the
temporal proximity of the event to any waiver, the severity of any resulting injury, and
behavioral indicators of cognitive impairment like slurred words, confusion, or ab-
normal movements.583 Not included in this list are references to studies investigating
578 Kane & White, supra note 22, at 100.
579 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
580 United States v. Gonzales, 719 F. Supp. 2d 167, 180–81 (D. Mass. 2010); see United
States v. Havlik, 710 F.3d 818, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2013) (assessing the circumstances of Ap-
pellant’s arrest and the injuries he suffered therefrom as part of a waiver validity determination);
United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 549 (6th Cir. 1977) (“The circumstances of the arrest
and the amount of force employed have relevance to determining Appellant’s state of mind
when he made the incriminating statements a short time afterwards.”).
581 See, e.g., Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 823–24 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Rezac, No. 3:16-CR-30051-RAL, 2017 WL 2536540, at *3–4 (D. S.D. June 9, 2017); People
v. Panah, 107 P.3d 790, 840–41 (Cal. 2005); People v. Whitson, 949 P.2d 18, 29 (Cal. 1998);
Harris v. State, 475 S.W.3d 227, 230–31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
582 See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, No. 2:12-cr-114-Ftn1-99SPC, 2013 WL 1899604, at
*1–4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2013).
583 See, e.g., United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2008), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Annis,
446 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2006); Kirk, 2013 WL 1899604, at *8–9; Gonzales, 719 F. Supp. 2d
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the cognitive impairments suffered by those who are arrested in a violent manner.
That is, there are no base, objective data on cognitive decline resulting from certain
distressing circumstances upon which courts layer subjective, observational factors.
The absence of such a scientific foundation in court determinations is, however,
reflective of an anemic literature. As noted above, scholarship examining the inter-
action between acute stress and cognition roundly shows the former deleteriously
affecting the latter, but the experiment parameters are not comparable to forceful
arrest methods.584 Acute stress is experimentally induced in a number of different
ways, including: the stimulation of small degrees of pain (by way of, for example,
brief electric shocks or the submersion of participants’ hands in cold water),585
threats of pain or other unpleasant interactions,586 the imposition of stressful social
situations,587 and the artificial introduction of stress hormones into subjects.588 It is
understood that “[m]odeling acute pain remains a significant scientific and ethical
challenge,” let alone modeling acute, violent, and painful arrest circumstances.589
Those studies that assess the cognitive effects of potentially comparable situations
do not examine acute effects, but rather analyze mental impacts some time after the
at 181; Harris, 475 S.W.3d at 230–32; Commonwealth v. Talmadge Garwood, 1 Phila.Co.Rptr.
89, 92–94 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1978).
584 See supra notes 574–75 and accompanying text.
585 See generally, e.g., C. Richard Chapman et al., Central Noradrenergic Mechanisms
and the Acute Stress Response During Painful Stimulation, 28 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
1135 (2014); Geert Crombez et al., The Disruptive Nature of Pain: An Experimental Inves-
tigation, 34 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 911 (1996); Priya G. Patil et al., Effects of a Cold-
Water Stressor on Psychomotor and Cognitive Functioning in Humans, 58 PHYSIOLOGY &
BEHAV. 1281 (1995).
586 See generally, e.g., Kesong Hu et al., Threat of Bodily Harm Has Opposing Effects on
Cognition, 12 EMOTION 28 (2012); Dean Mobbs et al., Neural Activity Associated with Monitor-
ing the Oscillating Threat Value of a Tarantula, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 20582 (2010);
Oliver J. Robinson et al., The Effect of Induced Anxiety on Cognition: Threat of Shock Enhances
Aversive Processing in Healthy Individuals, 11 COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE & BEHAV. NEUROSCI-
ENCE 217 (2011); Oliver J. Robinson et al., The Impact of Anxiety Upon Cognition: Per-
spectives from Human Threat of Shock Studies, 7 FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2013).
587 See generally, e.g., Jonathan Guez et al., The Effect of Trier Social Stress Test (TSST)
on Item and Associative Recognition of Words and Pictures in Healthy Participants, 7 FRON-
TIERS PSYCHOL. 1 (2016); Christian J. Merz et al., The Impact of Psychosocial Stress on
Conceptual Knowledge Retrieval, 134 NEUROBIOLOGY LEARNING & MEMORY 392 (2016);
Taiki Takahashi et al., Social Stress-Induced Cortisol Elevation Acutely Impairs Social
Memory in Humans, 363 NEUROSCIENCE LETTERS 125 (2004).
588 See generally, e.g., Sonia J. Lupien & Bruce S. McEwen, The Acute Effects of Cortico-
steroids on Cognition: Integration of Animal and Human Model Studies, 24 BRAIN RES. REV.
1 (1997); Sonia J. Lupien et al., The Effects of Stress and Stress Hormones on Human
Cognition: Implications for the Field of Brain and Cognition, 65 BRAIN & COGNITION 209
(2007); John W. Newcomer et al., Decreased Memory Performance in Healthy Humans
Induced by Stress-Level Cortisol Treatment, 56 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 527 (1999).
589 Valéry Legrain et al., A Neurocognitive Model of Attention to Pain: Behavioral and
Neuroimaging Evidence, 144 PAIN 230, 232 (2009).
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incidents; they typically investigate the more distant and constant effects of chronic
exposure to violence.590
Nevertheless, the aforementioned research appears relevant to considerations of
the potential impacts of stressful circumstances—particularly highly stressful cir-
cumstances like forceful arrests—on a defendant’s ability to knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights. But scholars have largely failed
to build on this work by explicitly exclaiming its pertinence to in-custody waiver
assessments or conducting experiments involving the imposition of stress while
subjects undertake legally relevant tasks. The three studies that have examined the
connection between stress and Miranda warning comprehension only involve stress
being induced by accusations of wrongdoing.591 They each find that comprehension
is diminished in such situations.592 These works aside, research on Miranda warning
590 See generally, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton et al., Battered Women’s Cognitive Schemata,
7 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 237 (1994); Salah U. Qureshi et al., Does PTSD Impair Cognition
Beyond the Effect of Trauma?, 23 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 16 (2011);
Kasey M. Saltzman et al., IQ and Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms in Children Exposed to
Interpersonal Violence, 36 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEV. 261 (2006); Patricia B. Sutker
et al., Cognitive Deficits and Psychopathology Among Former Prisoners of War and Combat
Veterans of the Korean Conflict, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 67 (1991); Elizabeth W. Twamley
et al., Cognitive Impairment and Functioning in PTSD Related to Intimate Partner Violence,
15 J. INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGY SOC’Y 879 (2009).
591 Richard Rogers et al., Decrements in Miranda Abilities: An Investigation of Situational
Effects via a Mock-Crime Paradigm, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 392, 392 (2011); Kyle C. Scherr
& Stephanie Madon, “Go Ahead and Sign”: An Experimental Examination of Miranda Waivers
and Comprehension, 37 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 208, 208 (2013) [hereinafter Scherr & Madon, “Go
Ahead and Sign”]; Kyle C. Scherr & Stephanie Madon, You Have the Right to Understand:
The Deleterious Effect of Stress on Suspects’ Ability to Comprehend Miranda, 36 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 275, 275 (2012) [hereinafter Scherr & Madon, You Have the Right to Understand].
592 Rogers et al., supra note 591, at 398; Scherr & Madon, “Go Ahead and Sign,” supra
note 591, at 214; Scherr & Madon, You Have the Right to Understand, supra note 591, at
281. It is, however, arguable whether these results should factor into court waiver assessments.
While Miranda and subsequent case law do not limit what influences on cognition can be
recognized, an accusatory environment is inherent to interrogations and waivers. In fact, this
is why Miranda warnings are required: to counter such an atmosphere by making individuals
aware of their rights and the consequences of waiving them. See supra notes 45–50 and
accompanying text. Accordingly, it could be contended that the warnings themselves are the
means intended by the Supreme Court to account for the inherent stress of in-custody ques-
tioning and that considering it separately leads to the double counting of this factor. So even
though the psychological pressure of interrogation can inhibit Miranda warning comprehension,
this pressure is an underlying constant upon which the Miranda framework is laid, and the
framework is therefore meant to take into account additional variables, not the basic stress
of in-custody questioning. In addition, or alternatively, it could be argued that officer conduct
is the determinative variable with regard to the stress of an interrogation (this is supported
by the articles cited in this footnote, which involve specific questioning approaches and
examine them either explicitly or implicitly). Rogers et al., supra note 591, at 396–97; Scherr
& Madon, “Go Ahead and Sign ,” supra note 591, at 210; Scherr & Madon, You Have the Right
to Understand, supra note 591, at 277–78. This stress is, therefore, already accounted for by
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comprehension, waiver volition, and cognitive ability focuses entirely on more
constant personal characteristics, such as age,593 education and specific academic
skills (e.g., reading and listening comprehension),594 mental health,595 and intelli-
gence (as measured by IQ tests).596 Consequently, for an extensive amount of time
there has been no legal situation-oriented objective data for courts or attorneys to turn
to with regard to the cognitive effects of forceful arrest methods and their implica-
tions for in-custody rights waivers. The works presented in detail in this Article
finally alter this persistent reality.597 In doing so, they will hopefully stimulate more
work in the area from more researchers and be a frequently relied upon resource for
legal practitioners who confront the situations the studies address, adding an important
and much-needed objective stepping stone to what is generally a highly subjective
and discretionary review process.
Having assessments of the influence of forceful arrests on an individual’s capacity
to waive her constitutional rights completely untethered from objective data, as it
currently is, is potentially problematic. This is illustrated by two hypothetical situations
that might cause courts to differentially consider the cognitive effects of a forceful ar-
rest. The first involves authorities employing a degree of force to subdue a defendant
deemed unwarranted by a court, whether intentionally or because they misappreciate
the situation, and the defendant waiving his rights shortly thereafter. Meaningfully
weighting any alleged cognitive impairment he suffered as a result of the physical
court analysis of officer interrogation methods and whether they are improper. See supra
notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
593 See generally, e.g., ALAN GOLDSTEIN & NAOMI E. SEVIN GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING
CAPACITY TO WAIVE MIRANDA RIGHTS 55–63 (2010); Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence
to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV.
26 (2006); Grisso, supra note 107, at 1134; Ronald Roesch et al., The Capacity of Juveniles
to Understand and Waive Arrest Rights, in LEARNING FORENSIC ASSESSMENT: RESEARCH
AND PRACTICE 251–71 (Rebecca Jackson & Ronald Roesch eds., 2d ed. 2016).
594 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 593, at 66–68. See generally Daniel
P. Greenfield et al., Retrospective Evaluation of Miranda Reading Levels and Waiver Compe-
tency, 19 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 75 (2001); Rachel Kahn et al., Readability of Miranda
Warnings and Waivers: Implications for Evaluating Miranda Comprehension, 30 L. &
PSYCHOL. REV. 119 (2006).
595 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 593, at 70–72. See generally, e.g.,
Cooper & Zapf, supra note 106; William C. Follette et al., Mental Health Status and Vulner-
ability to Police Interrogation Tactics, 22 CRIM. JUST. 42 (2007); Richard Rogers et al., Knowing
and Intelligent: A Study of Miranda Warnings in Mentally Disordered Defendants, 31 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 401 (2007).
596 See GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 593, at 63. See generally, e.g., Cloud et al.,
supra note 103; Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Assessing the Capacity of Persons
with Mental Retardation to Waive Miranda Rights: A Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 53 (2004); Michael J. O’Connell et al., Miranda Comprehension in
Adults with Mental Retardation and the Effects of Feedback Style on Suggestibility, 29 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 359 (2005).
597 See supra Section II.C.2.
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confrontation, aside from any manifestations of mental deficits, is very clearly in line
with the purpose of the law of Miranda to safeguard constitutional rights and deter
objectionable law enforcement conduct.598 The narrative is that improper police be-
havior impacted a defendant’s capacity to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waive his constitutional rights, making it an attractive fact to be recognized to have
diminished his cognitive capacity in a subjective assessment framework.
The second situation, however, involves authorities employing a degree of force
to arrest a defendant deemed reasonable by a court, whether actually reasonable or
reasonable based on legitimate officer beliefs at the time, and the defendant waiving
his rights shortly thereafter. Here, an individual ostensibly brought violence upon
himself, and may have even endangered the health or lives of officers. Considering
cognitive decline resulting simply from the confrontation, let alone considering it
in a meaningful way, awards the defendant a favorable fact for conducting himself
in a socially and legally undesirable fashion. A purely subjective assessment frame-
work allows courts to consider this and decide that the arrest circumstance did not
affect a defendant’s cognitive abilities.
United States v. Mack and United States v. Patterson (two cases involving
CEWs presented above) provide examples of this type of reasoning.599 In Mack,
before delving into the potential cognitive effects of the CEW strikes in question,
the court describes the appropriateness of the degree of force utilized by officers to
subdue the defendant, clearly deeming the information relevant.600 When it moves
on to specifically address Mack’s mental state at the time of waiver, it notes the
following: testimony of officers who had experienced CEW strikes putting forth that
once the electrical current discharged by a CEW ceases, “they were able to function
normally”;601 that the defendant provided no evidence of the cognitive effects of
CEWs; and that he understood and complied with the commands of officers and
responded affirmatively when administered a Miranda warning and asked if he
understood his rights.602 While the court’s conclusion that Mack’s waiver was know-
ing, intelligent, and voluntary is arguably unobjectionable,603 its entirely subjective
598 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 426 (1977) (commenting that the law of Miranda
is “designed to safeguard other constitutional guarantees and deter impermissible police
conduct”); see also Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d 1407, 1427–28 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
“voluntary” prong of the Miranda waiver standard ensures that “a waiver is uncoerced” and
“‘deter[s] lawless conduct by police and prosecution,’” while the “knowing and intelligent”
prong aims to provide that individuals are aware of their rights and options in the face of gov-
ernment pressure (internal citation omitted)).
599 United States v. Patterson, No. 3:09-cr-7(S1)-J-32TEM, 2009 WL 10670083, at *1
(M.D. Fla. June 22, 2009); United States v. Mack, No. 07-238, 2009 WL 580430, at *1 (M.D.
La. Mar. 6, 2009).
600 Mack, 2009 WL 580430, at *2 & n.7.
601 Id. at *3 n.11.
602 Id. at *3 & n.9.
603 See id. at *3.
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analysis ignores the fact that, since the defendant was subjected to three CEW
strikes immediately prior to his waiver (one apparently involving darts and electrical
current and two from the device in drive-stun mode),604 he was experiencing some
degree of cognitive impairment. With no objective data before it, the court was not
forced to at least tersely address this reality.
In Patterson, the court begins its assessment of the potential psychological
impacts of CEW strikes by paraphrasing an officer’s testimony that includes the
following: “[E]lectrical charge generated from the Taser [sic] affects the muscle tissue,
but it does not affect the brain,” and, “[N]o one he has tased has ever lost cognitive
function, or the ability to speak and otherwise communicate rationally.”605 It then cites
Mack, in which the waiver was deemed valid despite very recent CEW administra-
tions.606 Finally, as part of its appraisal of the CEW’s mental effects, the court explains
that the degree of force employed by law enforcement to subdue the defendant was
appropriate.607 Although the time between the CEW strike and waiver was longer
in this case than in Mack,608 the court’s entirely subjective analytical approach allows
it to avoid confronting the objective cognitive impairment experienced by individu-
als immediately following forceful arrests. This is highlighted by a subsequent, more
lengthy analysis of Patterson’s claim that he was also intoxicated at the time of
waiver and that this additionally prevented him from adequately comprehending his
rights.609 Here, the court begins with the premise that intoxication diminishes a per-
son’s ability to think, and works against this objective impact to ultimately conclude
that the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.610
The hypotheticals and cases above show how an influence scientifically shown
to diminish cognitive faculties can be disregarded or considered incorrectly in a
system of review insulated from objective inputs. The incorporation of study data
on cognitive declines in those subjected to forceful arrest situations in in-custody
rights waiver determinations would remove a measure of subjectivity and discretion
from court considerations of these events. While this is unlikely to significantly
influence judicial determinations, arrests involving physical confrontation should
be facts indicative of mental diminishment, full stop. That is, just as a low IQ test
score weighs against a waiver being knowledgeable, intelligent, and voluntary, so
too should a forceful arrest when the waiver occurs close enough in time to such an
incident. This fact should then be intermixed with personal qualities of a defendant
and observations to approximate his cognitive abilities at the time of waiver.
604 Id. at *2–3.
605 United States v. Patterson, No. 3:09-cr-7(S1)-J-32TEM, 2009 WL 10670083, at *6
(M.D. Fla. June 22, 2009).
606 Id. (citing Mack, 2009 WL 580430, at *3).
607 Id. (citing Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004)).
608 Compare id. at *2, with Mack, 2009 WL 580430, at *1.
609 Patterson, at *7–8.
610 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Coercion by way of CEW is a ubiquitous means of law enforcement, deployed
against hundreds of thousands of criminal suspects annually.611 Determining whether
such tactics subvert the Constitution is therefore a critical enterprise to ensure the just
functioning of the criminal legal system. Endeavoring to do so in a rigorous, science-
focused fashion, this Article deduces a number of matters of cross-disciplinary import.
First, it details the cognitive facets of the requirements that a defendant’s in-
custody waiver of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights be knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.612 And that courts tend to rely on subjective observation when
assessing individual psychological competence over objective indicia (e.g., age,
education, and mental health).613 This places a high bar on the latter metrics—which
include the research-ascertained cognitive effects of CEWs—in terms of the degree
of mental impairment they must indicate to meaningfully sway courts on their own.
Second, the population of studies on the relationship between CEW administra-
tions and mental deficits reveals the former to negatively influence the latter, but to
a degree similar to other forceful arrest methods (e.g., person-to-person physical
force, canine attack, and pepper spray administration).614 Accordingly, while arrest
via CEW should be a factor in judicial assessments of the validity of in-custody
rights waivers, so should other forceful modes of subduing individuals. And the
cognitive effects of CEW administrations do not warrant unique legal safeguards for
those subjected to these weapons.
Finally, a complete lack of reliance by courts on research findings indicating
that forceful arrest methods diminish cognitive faculties is disclosed. Instead, they
subjectively appraise individual arrest circumstances and whether they influenced
defendant mental acuity at the time of waiver.615 And scholarship on Miranda
warning and constitutional rights comprehension largely ignores the effects of arrest
circumstances. This Article therefore puts forth that forceful arrest methods are an
objectively negative influence on a defendant’s ability to knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive his rights when close in temporal proximity to the waiver.
Ultimately, one can tase the Constitution, but one can, among other abuses,
bludgeon and pepper spray it as well. Going forward, researchers should further
develop the body of literature on these means of arrest and the impact they have on
individuals’ mental competence to assert or waive their constitutional rights. In
addition, courts should consider forceful arrest methods, conducted close in time to
waivers, per se negative influences on such competence.
611 See supra notes 265–68 and accompanying text.
612 See supra Part I.
613 See supra Section I.D.
614 See supra Section II.B.2.
615 See supra Section I.D and Part III.
